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I. Introduction
As the baby boomer generation ages, nations across the globe must
face the increasing costs associated with supporting a growing elderly
population.1 Unlike many nations, the United States is fortunate that a large
portion of this burden will fall on the shoulders of world’s largest pool of
private retirement assets.2 However, of the 130 million Americans
depending on employer provided private pensions, over 51 percent bear the
risk of facing a reduced standard of living in retirement;3 the prospects are
especially bleak for minority retirees.4 One result of the modern American
trend toward adopting defined contribution pension schemes is that
employees now have greater control over their pension’s investment
success in that they can now select from a pool of employer provided
investment options. One inherent drawback to this increased employee
control is that, unlike the previous system under which the employers were
required to maintain either insurance of a specific reserve fund in case of
loss, the employees now bear the risk of a poor return.5 This decision to
1. See JAMES C. CAPRETTA, GLOBAL AGING AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC
PENSION SYSTEMS: AN ASSESSMENT OF REFORM EFFORTS IN TWELVE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
1 (2007), available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/pension_profile.pdf (examining
the problems facing, and current retirement infrastructure of, twelve different developed
nations).
2. See id. at 48 (explaining the problems facing multiple developing nations
regarding the increasing number of retirees globally and noting that the United States is
uniquely situated due to possession of the world’s largest private pension system).
3. See John C. Scott, Are Americans Losing The Chance To Retire Comfortably?,
Scholars
Strategy
Network
(2012),
available
at
http://www.scholarsstrategy
network.org/sites/default/files/ssn_key_findings_scott_on_private_retirement_plans.
pdf (explaining that the three major sources of retirement funding in the United States
comes from Social Security, individual earnings and savings, and pension benefits and
that three out of every five people in the active work force rely, at least in part, on a
private employer retirement plan).
4. See id. (explaining that African American households are disproportionately
affected by the increased instability in retirement savings).
5. See id. (explaining that the major effect of the modern shift from defined benefit to
defined contribution plans is that the burden of risk is shifted from the employer to the plan
enrollee).
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place the burden-of-risk exclusively on plan enrollees invokes memories of
the social injustices that pervaded the pre-Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA)6 pension system and increases retirement instability
for the millions of low-income households that lack the financial literacy
required for prudent investment.7 Faced with the prospect of losing their
retirement security, more and more prospective retirees are choosing to use
stock drop lawsuits in a last ditch attempt to recover pension plan losses
incurred from the selection of imprudently provided employer investment
options.8 With this increased focus on litigation, comes a fundamental
question: Are these retiree stock drop plaintiffs entitled to a Seventh
Amendment jury?9 Assuming one believes that juries may be swayed by the
relative financial resources of the opposing parties, an affirmative answer to
this question could significantly increase a plaintiff’s chances of successful
recovery and might represent a small step toward softening the social
injustice associated with placing investment risk on the shoulders of lowincome households. 10
As this Note will discuss, the availability of an ERISA jury trial boils
down to whether the relief sought can be categorized as arising at law or in
equity. In an attempt to resolve this question, courts have focused on the
6. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2000)).
7. See infra Part II (discussing several of the administrative risks associated with the
largely unregulated pre-1974 private pension system and the destabilizing social effect of
insufficient retirement security).
8. See VANGUARD CONSULTING, MITIGATING FIDUCIARY LIABILITY FOR DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION
PLAN
INVESTMENT
DECISIONS
1–7
(2013),
available
at
https://institutional.vanguard.com/iam/pdf/mitigating_fiduciary_liability.pdf (explaining that
an increased number of high profile “stock drop” class action suits had arisen against plan
fiduciaries for poor plan provided investment options in defined contribution plans and
discussing several strategies for reducing plan fiduciary liability); see also MORGAN LEWIS,
WHITE PAPER: SUPREME COURT TO DECIDE APPLICABILITY OF THE ‘PRUDENCE PRESUMPTION”
IN ERISA STOCK CASES: ESOP AND 401(K) PLAN SPONSORS AND FIDUCIARIES, TAKE NOTES 1
(2013) (explaining that more than 200 ERISA employer “stock drop” class action lawsuits
have been filed alleging that plan fiduciaries breach their ERISA duties of prudence and
loyalty by allowing participants to invest in employer stock).
9. See infra Part V.
10. See Michael McCabe, Jr., Comment, The Right To A Jury In Benefit Recovery
Actions Brought Under ERISA Section 502(A)(1)(B), 20 U. BALT. L. REV. 479 (1991) (“The
importance of a jury trial to the plaintiff becomes obvious if one believes that the jury may
be swayed by the relative financial resources of the opposing parties.”); See e.g., J. FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL 111, 114, 121 & n.9 (1950) (discussing external factors which might sway
jury opinion).
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fact that several modern Supreme Court cases addressing ERISA’s remedial
regime are viewed as narrowing the definition of “equitable relief.”11 While
the reasoning of these cases received some criticism, other scholars
speculate that claims that were previously believed to be purely equitable
under the old definition of “equitable relief” might now fall outside the
court’s narrower definition and, as a result, constitute “legal relief” entitled
to a Seventh Amendment jury trial.12 Despite a general consensus that the
majority of ERISA’s remedial provisions do not support a jury trial, little
scholarly analysis addresses this question in the context of section 502(a)(2)
stock drop actions.13 This Note will investigate the availability of a stock
drop jury trial through a case study and critique of the recent Missouri
District Court ruling Hellman v. Cataldo,14 in which the court held that the
Supreme Court’s new narrow definition of “equitable relief” required
categorization of the stock drop recovery as “legal relief” for purposes of
the Seventh Amendment.15
This Note’s examination begins with a review of the social justice
concerns that underpin the modern ERISA system and a brief study of the
common law of trusts, which together facilitate the Note’s first
conclusion—trust law is fundamental to the foundation of the ERISA
11. See generally Thomas P. Gies & Jane R. Foster, Leaving Well Enough Alone:
Reflections on the Current State of ERISA Remedial Law, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 449
(2009) (discussing the narrowing of the definition of “equitable relief” by the Supreme Court
in cases addressing ERISA section 502(a)(3)).
12. See Andrew T. Kusner, Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, and The ERISA Liability Of
The Professional Service Provider, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 273, 282–85 (1994)
(discussing the narrowing consequences of the Supreme Court equating the definition of
“appropriate” in section 409(a) to “typically”).
13. Compare Denise Drake Clemow & Lisa Hund Lattan, ERISA Section 510 Claims:
No Right To A Jury Trial Can Be Found, 73 NEB. L. REV. 756 (1994) (focusing on the
equitable foundations of the ERISA remedial provisions and concluding that no right to a
jury trial exists for an action brought under ERISA section 510), with Amy Nixon, Note,
Employee Benefits: ERISA Enhanced Benefit Claims And The Seventh Amendment: No
Common Ground in The Tenth Circuit—Adams v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 52 OKLA. L.
REV. 665 (1999) (arguing that some claims brought under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) are
entitled to a jury trial because they seek “legal relief”).
14. See Hellman v. Cataldo, No. 4:12CV02177, 2013 WL 4482889, *1 (E.D. Mo.,
Aug. 20, 2013) (concluding that the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial because the remedy
sought was substantively one for “legal relief” under the modern precedent of the Supreme
Court).
15. See id. at *4 (basing its conclusion based upon the Great-West test and
restitutionary distinction between restitutionary legal relief and traceable equitable
restitution).
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remedial regime.16 This Note will next examine the line of Supreme Court
cases that courts use to determine whether a claim is equitable or legal for
purposes of the Seventh Amendment and ERISA.17 Third, our case study
begins with a summary of Hellman v. Cataldo, in which a Missouri district
court found that the 401(k) pension plan beneficiary plaintiff was
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial.18 Finally, after examining the District
Court’s reasoning in Hellman, this Note will examine several important
questions that emerge from the opinion’s reasoning and ultimately conclude
that, despite ERISA’s social injustice origins, no constitutional jury trial
right exists for pension plan participants bringing section 502(a)(2) stock
drop class actions.19
II. History of ERISA
Congress passed ERISA in 1974 to protect employees enrolled in
private employer benefit plans from the under-inclusive and discriminatory
practices that previously rendered such plans an unreliable source of
retirement security.20 Prior to 1974, “workers were often subject to
significant pension plan vesting provisions . . . [and] premature plan
termination[s]” which often resulted in either complete or partial loss of
benefits.21 In addition, conflicting state schemes and an absence of national
oversight frequently facilitated administrative abuse and mismanagement of
plan assets.22 The inherent risk associated with deferral of pension
payments far into the future became known as “default risk” and those that
resulted from insufficient regulatory oversight became known as
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V.
20. See Chase A. Tweel, Retirement Saving In The Face of Increasing Longevity: The
Advantages of Deferring Retirement, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 103, 106–107 (2010) (noting
that public opinion eventually “coalesced around the idea of federal protection of pensions
based on concerns about mismanagement of assets, forfeiture of pension rights, and default
by failing businesses”); see also ERISA, § 2, 29 U.S.C. §1001 (noting growth in popularity
of private pension plans as one of the reasons for setting a national regulatory standard).
21. Jack E. Morris, Small Employers and Group Health Insurance: Should ERISA
Apply?, 52 LA. L. REV. 971, 977 (1992).
22. See id. (highlighting the need to “protect workers from pension plan abuses and
employers from multiple and conflicting state regulations” as some of the problems in the
pre-1974 private pension system).
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“administrative risk.”23 Both forms of risk were especially harmful to lowincome households that, unlike wealthier segments of the population, were
exclusively reliant on their pensions for retirement savings. 24 As a result,
several aspects of the pre-ERISA pension system were viewed as socially
unjust. This inequity was eventually brought to national prominence as a
result of the economic downturn of the Great Depression,25 increased
utilization of private pensions as an alternative form of compensation after
World War II,26 and catastrophic events like the 1963 Studebaker
Corporation pension failure.27
The Studebaker incident operates as the classic example of the type of
Pre-ERISA private pension plan deficiencies that contributed to a public
outcry for reform.28 Studebaker’s closure of its plant in South Bend,
Indiana resulted in a pension plan default.29 Because the plan was funded
on an ongoing basis, the trust ended up “$15,000,000 short of being able to
23. See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means By “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s
Trial Of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1322 (2003)
(“ERISA was primarily designed to protect pension plan participants and beneficiaries
against two hazards, default risk and administrative risk.”).
24. See Stuart N. Alperin et al., The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974: Policies and Problems, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 539, 547 (1975) (explaining that
inequalities with the pre-1974 pension system resulted in workers realizing that the pensions
they had relied upon failed to materialize by their time of retirement).
25. See Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted? The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: The First Decade, in SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON
AGING, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE EMPLOYMENT RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF
1974: THE FIRST DECADE 1,2 (Comm. Print 1984).[hereinafter Gordon] (“By the onset of the
Great Depression, of the 1930’s, many private pension plans were bankrupt[,] . . . . insecure,
inflexible and discriminatory.”).
26. See id. at 3 (identifying war-time tax incentives and wage-price controls as two
reasons that “both management and labor rechanneled pressures for higher wage rates into
fringe benefits”).
27. See id. at 8 (describing that closure of the facility resulted in failure of the private
pension plan and that many blue collar employees “lost some or all of their vested
pensions”).
28. See James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 684
(2001) (describing the pension plan failure as a “focusing event” which served as a vivid
symbol of the hazards regulation aimed to redress and which would be invoked “again and
again in the decade before Congress passed ERISA”).
29. See id. at 729–30 (noting that years of fiscal decline, recent company bankruptcy,
and closure of the South Bend plant rendered the fate of the pension plan “a forgone
conclusion” and that one cause of the insolvency was the fact that the pension plan was a
funded on an ongoing basis).
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fund the company’s pension promises to 4,392 present and former
employees.”30 As a result, nearly 4,400 plan beneficiaries prior to
retirement age, including many whose pension rights had already vested,
either completely lost, or lost significant portions of, their anticipated
benefits.31 The incident provided an ideal opportunity to get lawmakers to
seriously consider reform and, as one Capitol Hill staffer put it, was viewed
as “the most glorious story of failure in the business.”32 Understanding the
prevalence of these inequities in the pre-1974 pension system is
fundamental to an acute appreciation of the role that trust law ultimately
came to play in the modern ERISA framework.33
Two years prior to the Studebaker incident, in an effort to address the
problems in the private employer pension system, President Kennedy
established the Commission on Money and Credit (Commission) to
examine “private pension plans and [make] a series of recommendations
concerning their regulation.”34 Three years after being established, the
Commission put forward a series of recommendations including: the
imposition of uniform minimum vesting standards,35 uniform mandatory
minimum funding levels,36 and, in an effort to address plan
mismanagement, “greater supervision over the investment of pension fund
assets.”37 After roughly a decade of debate, and with the purpose of
enacting many of the reforms identified by the Commission, Congress
passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”);
President Gerald Ford signed the Act into law on September 2, 1974.38

30. Id. at 730.
31. See id. at 731 (“Vested employees less than sixty years of age . . . received a lump
sum payment worth about 15% of the value of their pension . . . . [while] employees under
forty [] got nothing.”).
32. Id. at 686.
33. See infra Part II, Section B.
34. Gordon, supra note 25, at 7.
35. See Gordon id. at 9 (proscribing “mandatory minimum vesting standards” for
employees at fifteen and twenty years of continuous employment).
36. See id. (recommending that “all accrued benefit liabilities be amortized” over a
thirty year period with a required certification process every three years to insure actuary
compliance).
37. Id. at 7–8.
38. See Wooten, supra note 28, at 739 (observing that President Ford’s signature came
nearly a decade after the Studebaker shutdown ensured Congress would take a hard look at
the pre-1974 private pension plan problems that the case eventually “came to symbolize”).
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A. Scope & Structure of ERISA

ERISA attempts to eliminate the socially unjust administrative risks
that plagued the pre-1974 system through inclusion of a broad pre-emption
provision that eliminates the relevance of conflicting state regulatory
structures.39 Scholars have described this pre-emption provision as
“sweeping as broadly as the English Language allows.”40 By establishing a
single national regulatory scheme, Congress simplified compliance and
eliminated widespread confusion surrounding efficient multi-state plan
administration.41 The broad scope of preemption also created a “remedial
void” in which ERISA operates as the sole source of regulation and relief.42
The Act contains a broad range of substantive regulations that include
specific disclosure requirements,43 participation standards, vesting
requirements,44 minimum funding requirements,45 and fiduciary
obligations.46 While no employer is required to provide retirement benefits,
those that do must ensure that their plan complies with any applicable
regulatory provisions.47 It is important to note that each of these substantive
provisions parallel reforms suggested in the 1964 Commission report.48
39. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012); see also DAVID A. PRATT & SHARON
REECE, ERISA AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 363 (2010) (“In an apparent
effort to federalize the field of employee benefit law, ERISA provides that it ‘shall supersede
any and all state laws insofar as they many now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan.’”).
40. Langbein, supra note 23, at 1331 (quoting Leon E. Irish & Harrison J. Cohen,
ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statutory Rigidity, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
109, 110 (1985)).
41. See Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987) (describing how
inconsistent state regulations could force employers to “keep certain records[,] . . . make
certain benefits available[,] . . . process claims in a certain way[,] . . . [or] comply with
certain fiduciary standards” in some states but not others).
42. See Langbein, supra note 23, at 1332 (describing a “remedial void” and arguing
the Court should be hesitant to interpret the federal protections, established to “protect plan
participants and beneficiaries,” as providing fewer remedial options than were present under
the prior regulatory scheme). Before ERISA, relief would have presumably been sought
under either a state statutory scheme or the common-law of trusts. Id.
43. See generally ERISA §§ 101–111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021–1031.
44. See generally id. §§ 201–211, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1061.
45. See generally id. §§ 301–306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081–1086.
46. See generally id. §§ 401–414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1114.
47. See PRATT & REECE, supra note 39, at 6–7 (discussing how, unlike Social Security
and Medicare, retirement and welfare plans are optional for employers).
48. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text (listing minimum vesting standards,
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ERISA pension plans come in two forms: the defined benefit plan49
and the defined contribution plan.50 Defined contribution plans place all
contributions to the plan into one or more personalized accounts and benefit
payments vary depending on the value of participant’s individualized
account.51 As such, defined contribution plan beneficiaries’ retirement
benefits are directly affected by the investment success or failure of the
funds in their personalized account.52 In contrast, defined benefit plans
include any pension plan that does not fall within the defined contribution
scheme.53 While this broad definition means that defined benefit plans can
vary widely in structure, the traditional example involves a single mass
employer held account subject to statutory funding requirements and over
which the employer has exclusive investment control.54 The modern private
pension system experienced a shift from defined benefit plans, common at
the statute’s inception, to defined contribution plans.55 As a result, a
majority of contemporary private plans consist of individualized accounts
and participant driven investment; a scheme that ultimately forces
“employees [to] shoulder all the risks [of loss]” and increases the risk of

minimum funding levels, and fiduciary obligations to avoid administrative and default risk
as potential solutions to pre-1974 deficiencies).
49. See ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (2012) (defining “”defined benefit
plan”).
50. See id. at § 1002(34) (defining “defined contribution plan”).
51. See PRATT & REECE, supra note 39, at 16 (explaining that the benefits payable
under the plan depend on the amount of the total between (1) employer contributions,
(2) employee contributions, (3) forfeitures from termination of employment prior to vesting,
and (4) beneficiary’s share of plan’s investment earnings or losses).
52. See id. at 17 (explaining that defined contribution plans can never be underfunded
or overfunded because the total value of participant’s account is always equal to the total
value of the plan assets).
53. See id. (explaining that, under a traditional defined benefit plan, the plan itself
specifies the benefit payable on termination of employment determined by (1) average salary
and (2) length of employee’s service).
54. See id. (noting that the plan typically retains an actuary to calculate the amount
that will be required at the employee’s retirement date and such amount depends on
(1) amount of annual pension, (2) predicted plan investment income, (3) mortality
assumptions, and (4) form of benefit payment).
55. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451,
471 (2004) (explaining that a “significant reversal of historic patterns under which the
traditional defined benefit plan was the dominant paradigm for the provision of retirement
income” is underway).
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retirement insecurity for low-income households that lack investment
experience.56
In addition to the substantive regulations discussed above, ERISA also
contains remedial provisions.57 Section 502(a) authorizes participants to
bring enforcement actions where conduct violates either the employee’s
rights or an administrator’s fiduciary obligations.58 The remedial provisions
relevant to this Note are sections 502(a)(1),59 502(a)(3),60 and 502(a)(2).61
Despite the complex nature and broad scope of these provisions, Congress
failed to address the issue of jury trial availability.62
ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) allows participants or beneficiaries “to
recover benefits due” under “the terms of the plan, to enforce [their] rights
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify [their] rights under the terms of the
plan.”63
Although claims under 502(a)(1) have been largely
uncontroversial, courts have disagreed on whether the recovery is legal or
equitable—and thus whether plan participants can demand a Seventh
Amendment jury trial.64
56. See SCOTT, supra note 3 (explaining that neither the defined benefit nor defined
contribution structure is “completely risk-free, but who bears the burden of risk is a key
difference” and that under the new system an employee with sub-par investment returns is
not guaranteed a fixed pension).
57. See ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2012) (detailing remedial provisions).
58. Langbein, supra note 23, at 1333; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S.
41, 52 (1987) (stating that ERISA’s remedial provisions constitute “one of the essential tools
for accomplishing the stated purposes” of the federal regulatory regime).
59. ERISA § 502(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (2012).
60. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012).
61. ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2012).
62. See PRATT & REECE, supra note 39, at 373 (observing that ERISA fails to address
the availability of a jury trial and that courts have been forced to determine whether the
actions brought are legal or equitable in nature in an effort to determine whether they fall
within the purview of the Seventh Amendment).
63. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2012).
64. See Eduard A. Lopez, Equitable Remedies For Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under
ERISA After Varity Corp. v. Howe, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 323, 331 (1997) (citing
Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 636 (3d Cir. 1989) as a case where an action for recovery
of benefits under 502(a)(1)(B) was equitable in nature and Novak v. Anderson Corp., 962
F.2d 757, 759 (8th Cir. 1992) as an example of a court finding it to be legal in nature); see
also George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Jury Trial Mandated For Benefit Claims Action, 25 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 361, 377 (1992) (identifying the major difference between courts that found
“benefits-due lawsuits” to be legal was that they observed a “contract-like” theory of benefit
plans, while courts that found the suit sounded in equity regarded them as “trust-like”); Note,
The Right To Jury Trial In Enforcement Actions Under Section 502(A)(1)(B) of ERISA, 96
HARV. L. REV. 737, 757 (1983) (arguing that no jury trial should be available in section
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ERISA section 502(a)(3) allows plan participants, beneficiaries, or
fiduciaries “to enjoin any act or practice which violates any [ERISA]
provision” or “to obtain other appropriate relief [which may be necessary
for redress].”65 The Supreme Court has characterized section 502(a)(3) “as
a catch-all provision giving the Court the flexibility to fashion any remedy
necessary to prevent injustice.”66 As Part II of this Note will discuss, the
remedies available under the “catch-all” provision are considerably
constricted by the Court’s narrowing definition of “equitable relief.”67
ERISA section 502(a)(2), the focus of this Note, allows the Secretary
of Labor or a plan participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to bring a civil
action “for appropriate relief under” section 409(a).68 Section 409(a)
provides that any plan fiduciary “who breaches any of [his] responsibilities,
obligations, or duties . . . shall be personally liable to make good to such
plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach . . . and shall be
subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate.”69 Similar to section 502(a)(1), courts frequently disagree over
whether the relief provided by section 502(a)(2) entitles the plaintiff to a
jury trial, i.e., whether the relief is legal or equitable.70 At least one district
court has cited to the narrowing definition of ERISA “equitable relief” as
proof that the provision provides “quasi-legal” relief within the scope of the
Seventh Amendment.71
502(a)(1)(B) actions because the plan-enforcement actions are merely affirmative
injunctions in disguise and thus within the pre-merger domain of equity).
65. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012).
66. PRATT & REECE, supra note 39, at 359.
67. See infra Part II. However, Yale Law School’s John Langbein criticized the Court
for failing to fully appreciate the core role that common-law trust plays as a foundation of
ERISA and for failing to realize that some forms monetary damages were historically
“equitable” in nature. See Langbein, supra note 23, at 1320–21.
68. ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2012).
69. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
70. Compare Abbot v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 06-cv-0701-MJR, 2007 WL
2316481 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2007) (finding that analogous actions at common law were
equitable and thus the action brought under 502(a)(2) pursuant to section 409(a) was
equitable in nature for purposes of the Seventh Amendment); with Chao v. Meixner, No.
1:07-cv-0595-WSD, 2007 WL 4225069 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 27, 2007) (finding that the
plaintiff’s 502(a)(2) action sought monetary relief for losses to the plan and sounded “at law
at least in part” entitling them to a jury trial).
71. See infra Parts III & IV (discussing the evolution of the Court’s definition of
“equitable relief” and the Missouri District Court’s ruling in Hellman v. Cataldo, No. 4:12cv-02177-AGF, 2013 WL 4482889 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 20, 2013)).
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B. ERISA’s Trust Law Heritage

While some ERISA regulatory provisions only affect pensions,72 the
sections governing fiduciary responsibilities are broadly applicable and
govern all ERISA benefit plans.73 Both legislative history and scholarly
opinion indicate that the drafters of the fiduciary provisions intended to
eliminate the retirement insecurity caused by the administrative risks of the
pre-1974 system by applying “rules and remedies similar to those under
traditional trust law.”74 As a result, trust law lies at the core of the ERISA
framework and a brief historical overview of that area of law is essential to
our analysis of the Act’s remedial provisions.75
1. Origin of the Trust
While remedies at law developed out of the early English writ system
of resolving legal disputes, equitable remedies developed at the hands of the
chancery courts as a supplementary source of relief.76 Trusts developed as
an exclusively equitably relationship in which the possessor of legal title,
the trustee, would hold and manage real property for the benefit of the
possessor of equitable title, the beneficiary.77 Trusts eventually incorporated
72. See ERISA § 201, 29 U.S.C. 1051(1) (2012) (addressing the coverage of
participation and vesting requirements); ERISA § 301, 29 U.S.C. 1081(a)(1) (2012)
(addressing the coverage of funding requirements).
73. See ERISA § 401, 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2012)(establishing fiduciary obligations
without limiting applicability to a particular type of benefit plan, i.e., retirement or welfare);
see also PRATT & REECE, supra note 39, at 80 (“The fiduciary standards of Title I of ERISA
apply to all employee benefit plans, both welfare benefit plans and pension plans.”).
74. Michael J. Collins, It’s Common, But Is It Right? The Common Law of Trusts in
ERISA Fiduciary Litigation, 16 LAB. LAW 391, 395 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 275
(1974) as stating that “[t]he objectives of [ERISA fiduciary responsibility] provisions are to
make applicable the law of trusts; . . . to establish uniform fiduciary standards . . . ; and to
provide effective remedies for breaches of trust.”); see also Langbein, supra note 23, at
1323–25 (arguing that statutory rules such as ERISA’s mandatory trusteeship and expansive
definition of “fiduciary” are indicative of the drafters’ intent to create fiduciary obligations
and remedies similar to those available with common-law trusts).
75. See Lopez, supra note 64, at 338–39 (discussing the exclusive jurisdiction of trusts
arising in courts of equity because of a refusal to enforce such relationships in courts at law).
76. See id. at 337–38 (discussing the separate development of courts of law based
upon common-law precedent and the early chancery court basing substantive decisions on
the kings conscious, cannon law, and ancient Roman law).
77. See DANAYA C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF SUCCESSION: WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
218 (2013) (observing that common law courts of King’s Bench and Common Pleas would
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fiduciary duties whereby obligations of loyalty and care flowed from the
trustee to his beneficiary.78
Common-law trusts evolved with the passage of time to hold money in
addition to real property.79 As a result, additional fiduciary obligations,
such as the requirement to conduct duties according to the standard of a
prudent businessman, to invest with the prudence of cautious conservatism,
and to prevent the intermingling of trustee and beneficiary funds,
developed.80 Beneficiaries possessed standing to bring a suit in chancery
court to ensure that the trustee’s conduct remained consistent with these
duties.81 In addition to enjoining conduct, in the case of wrongful sale of
trust assets, beneficiaries could bring suit to recover the proceeds of such
sale or, if the wrongful profits were reinvested, to follow the funds and
recover the proceeds.82 Finally, beneficiaries were permitted to bring suits
not look beyond “the simple fact of who had title”). The trust evolved from a special legal
relationship called a use that aristocrats implemented as a mechanism to avoid the negative
effects of wardship, which resulted from their estate escheating to the Crown when the title
holder died before his heir reached the age of twenty-one. Id. at 216. Early attempts to avoid
the negative effects of wardship required a permanent transfer of land to “religious orders or
municipal organizations” with an agreement that the land was to be held for the benefit of
the transferor or a third party. Id. at 218. While the equitable titleholder could still enjoy the
benefits of ownership, because the new holder of legal title could not die, the land could not
escheat and wardship was impossible. Id. at 217–18. Because courts at law would not
recognize the legal fiction of equitable title, which was inherent to the concept of the use,
one problem with the use was the possibility that the new titleholder would choose to move
onto the estate and evict the individual for whom the beneficial interest in the land was held.
Id. at 218. As a result, individuals turned to the courts of equity, which did recognize the
legal fiction and relationship created by the use, to “do what was right and just” by either
issuing an injunction or requiring the titleholder return legal title to the transferor. Id.
78. See id. at 219 (noting that “one of the most important aspects of the trust” is that
the “trustee (legal title holder) must have active responsibilities toward the property and the
beneficiaries”). In 1536 Parliament abolished all uses except for “active uses,” which
contained “some sort of affirmative duties or obligations toward the land or the
beneficiaries,” with the passage of the Statutes of Uses. Id. at 218. This legal fiction
eventually became known as a trust and the legal duties and obligations, which were
essential to the post-1536 survival of the active use, as fiduciary obligations. Id. at 219.
79. See Lopez, supra note 64, at 340 (discussing that that innovation of placing funds
in trusts eventually led to additional fiduciary duties being placed on trustees).
80. See id. (citing FREDRICK W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES 91–92,
216–17 (2d ed. 1936) as a source illustrating the various fiduciary duties that developed with
trust law).
81. See id. (noting that a trust beneficiary “could bring suit” for various purposes
including to remove a trustee for breach of trust).
82. See id. (listing various mechanisms by which a trust beneficiary could enforce his
rights under the trust).
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in equity to hold a trustee “personally liable to restore to the trust any
property that [was] wrongfully alienated or diminished” and “for any profits
lost . . . as a result of [the trustee’s] breach of duty.”83
2. Merger of Law and Equity
Several decades before the creation of ERISA, the federal courts of
law and equity merged with the passage of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938.84 Merger “create[d] a single set of procedures for all
legal claims.”85 One important exception to this procedural standardization
is that “jury trials [remain] [un]available in actions asserting . . . equitable
remed[ies].” 86
Despite the unification of procedure, post-merger trusts continue to
proscribe many of the same fiduciary obligations that originally developed
in 14th century England.87 The remedies “available for breach of trust [also
remain] substantially the same.”88 For example, post-merger trust
beneficiaries may still compel a trustee to perform his duties as trustee, 89
enjoin a breach of trust,90 or hold a trustee personally liable for losses
incurred or profits made as a result of such breach.91 Thus, modern trusts
are similar to their pre-merger predecessors in that they remain the subject
of equitable relief.92 This general rule is subject to two exceptions—the

83. Id.
84. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (providing that the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district
courts”); see also Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure,
44 YALE L.J. 387, 387–88 (1935) (identifying the congressional grant of authority which
would allow the Supreme Court to make rules which would govern both law and equity and
discussing the various reasons for merger).
85. Lopez, supra note 64, at 341.
86. Id.
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 169–85 (1959) (listing seventeen
separate fiduciary provisions that govern trustee conduct); see also supra note 64 and
accompanying text (outlining pre-merger trust remedies which parallel those found in the
most resent restatement).
88. Lopez, supra note 64, at 341.
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 199(a) (1959).
90. See id. § 199(b).
91. See id. § 199(c).
92. See id. § 197 (citing CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1880 (1966) as
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law permits concurrent legal remedies where a trustee is under a duty to
immediately and unconditionally pay money or return a chattel to a
beneficiary.93 With the above caveat however the only difference between
pre- and post-merger breach of trust claims is that modern actions can be
brought in federal courts that simultaneously sit in law and equity.94
3. Trust Model of ERISA
While ERISA’s vesting, participation, and funding provisions address
issues of default risk inherent in the long-term deferral of income, the
fiduciary provisions seek to decrease socially inequitable administrative
risk.95 As such, the latter provisions seek to decrease retirement instability
created by managerial abuse and frivolous plan investment.96 This is
accomplished by making administrators accountable to the households
harmed by their mismanagement through adoption of “rules and remedies
similar to those under traditional trust law.”97
Professor John Langbein argues that the trust origin of ERISA is
further evidenced by the fact that section 502(a)(2) parallels the equitable
remedies traditionally available for breach of trust.98 For example, Langbein
points to the fact that trust law supports an action to recover “(1) for loss
incurred, (2) for any profits that the trustee made in breach of trust, and

supporting the proposition that breach of trust sounds in equity not as a breach of contract
and thus abuse of plan administration requires an equitable remedy).
93. See id. §§ 198(1)–(2) (noting that these two legal remedies run concurrently with
potential equitable relief).
94. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (providing a single mechanism to invoke jurisdiction of all
federal courts).
95. See Langbein, supra note 23, at 1322 (citing funding requirements as one way in
which ERISA provisions have largely eliminated default risk by ensuring the sponsor
contributes enough to pay plan promises on an “actuarially sound basis”).
96. See id. at 1323 (observing the danger that “persons responsible for managing and
investing plan assets and paying claims may abuse their authority”, mismanage assets, or
improperly refuse to pay benefits and terming that risk “administrative risk”).
97. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 295 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038, 5076 (emphasis added); see also Langbein, supra note 23, at 1331 (quoting same
language to support criticism of later Supreme Court cases which distance ERISA from its
trust law base).
98. See Langbein, supra note 23, at 1333–34 (“[I]n capsule form, trust remedy law
allows recovery for loss, restitution of profits, and recovery of foregone gains.”).
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(3) for any gains that would have accrued but for the breach.”99 Similarly,
section 409(a), which proscribes liability for breach of ERISA fiduciary
duties, addresses the first two methods of recovery when it provides that the
fiduciary (1) “shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any
losses to the plan resulting from . . . breach, and [(2)] to restore to such plan
any profits [that] such fiduciary . . . made through use of [plan] assets” and
the third when it permits “such other equitable or remedial relief as the
court may deem appropriate.”100 Noting that no explanation exists for
section 409’s use of the broader phrase “equitable and remedial relief”
instead of the more precise trust standard, Langbein suggests that Congress
meant to facilitate adaption to new problems that might arise as a result of
applying trust remedies to ERISA benefit plans.101
The cumulative take away from these trust law parallels is that
Congress sought to eliminate the socially unjust societal harms inherent in
an unreliable retirement system.102 Making plan administrators accountable
to plan enrollees provided an important layer of protection for low-income
households and unskilled laborers that would otherwise lack any assurance
of retirement stability.103 The Supreme Court’s narrowing definition of
ERISA “equitable relief” has drawn sharp criticism for ignoring these
remedial goals and depriving plan participants of remedies that would be
available if the action sounded in post-merger common-law trust.104

99. See id. at 1333 (citing AUSTIN WAKERMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 205, at 237 (4th ed. 1988)).
100. ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2012); see also id. at 1335 (arguing that both
ERISA and trust law provide remedies for recovery of loss, recovery of profits, and recovery
of forgone gains).
101. Langbein, supra note 23, at 1335.
102. See id. at 1323–24 (explaining that defined benefit pension plan enrollees were
subject to administrative risk in the form of poor plan management, misuse of plan assets,
and improper refusal to pay benefits ).
103. See PAMELA PERUN & C. EUGENE STEUERLE, ERISA AT 50: A NEW MODEL FOR
THE PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM 1 (2000), available at http://www.urban.org/
uploadedpdf/retire_4.pdf (explaining that ERISA was revolutionary in that it “established
requirements for reporting and disclosure and standards for fiduciary responsibility,
administration, and enforcement where previously none existed”).
104. See e.g., Langbein, supra note 23, at 1338–62 (providing an in-depth analysis and
critique of the various cases addressed in Part II of this note based upon what the author
perceived to be the Supreme Court’s failure to recognize extent of ERISA’s trust based
origin and misconstruction of what relief was “traditionally available in equity”); see also
Collins, supra note 74, at 396 (drawing parallel between ERISA and pre-merger trust law) .
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III. Equitable or Legal Relief: The Jury Trial & ERISA
With a firm understanding of ERISA’s trust law heritage in hand, Part
III turns to examine the Supreme Court precedent on which our study case,
Hellman v. Cataldo, relied when it determined that section 502(a)(2)
entitles plaintiffs a constitutional jury trial. Availability of a civil jury trial
depends on the answer to two questions.105 First, whether congress
expressly or implicitly provided for a jury in statutory framework. 106
Second, if congress remained silent, whether the Seventh Amendment
nonetheless mandates a jury be made available.107 Because sections 409(a)
and 502(a)(2) are silent on the issue, this Note will focus on the second
inquiry; whether the Constitution mandates a jury trial be made available to
retirees bringing section 502(a)(2) “stock drop” suits.108
A. The Seventh Amendment
The Seventh Amendment was passed in 1791 and provides that “[i]n
suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”109 In an effort to
define “suits at common law” flexibly, the Supreme Court explained that

105. See McCabe, supra note 10, at 506 (concluding that in some instances jury trials
should be made available in section 502(a)(1)(B) benefit actions after engaging in an
examination of both the statutory test and, after finding it silent, the Seventh Amendment).
106. See, e.g., Allen v. United Mine Workers, 319 F.2d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 1963)
(finding an express right to a jury trial under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947);
Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959) (finding an implicit statutory
provision for a jury trial in a case brought under federal antitrust law).
107. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) (noting that the constitutional
analysis is only undertaken after it has been determined that federal statute cannot be
interpreted in such a way that “the [constitutional] question may be avoided” (quoting
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971))).
108. See ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2012) (lacking any language
which addresses the availability of a jury trial); see also Turner v. CF & I Steel Corp., 770
F.2d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986) (noting that ERISA does not
contain a provision addressing the right to a jury trial); PRATT & REECE, supra note 39, at
373 (“Congress . . . failed to specify whether a jury could try causes of action . . . arising
under ERISA”). If a constitutional entitlement is found, courts will likely interpret the
language of the statute to be consistent with such provision because courts will presume that
statutes enacted by congress were drafted in a way that is constitutionally consistent. See
Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982).
109. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).
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the “phrase . . . is used in contradistinction to equity. . . . [and means] not
merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled
proceedings, but [all] suits in which legal rights [are] to be ascertained and
determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone [are]
recognized, and equitable remedies [are] administered.”110 Thus, “the
amendment . . . embrace[s] all suits which are not of equity, . . . whatever
might be [their] peculiar form.”111
Because many modern statutory causes of action, including ERISA,
lack a direct pre-1791 corollary, the Supreme Court developed the
“historical test” to determine whether such actions adjudicate “legal” rights,
i.e., whether the Seventh Amendment requires jury trial availability.112 The
“historical test” makes this determination through the use of a two-step
analysis.113 First, courts must “compare the statutory action to 18th century
actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of
law and equity.”114 The Court made clear that identifying the appropriate
historically analogous cause of action “depends on the nature of the issue to
be tried rather than the character of the overall action.”115 Second, courts
must “examine the remedy sought [to] determine whether it is legal or
110. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 193 (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830)
(emphasis in original)); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987) (explaining
that, prior to the Seventh Amendment’s adoption, the jury trial was customarily only allowed
in the English law courts as opposed to those actions brought in the 18th century courts of
equity or admiralty).
111. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 193; see also Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477
(1962) (applying the Seventh Amendment to a statutory cause of action in trademark case);
Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 115 (1909) (applying the Seventh Amendment to a
statutory cause of action in an immigration case); Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street Lighting
Co., 240 U.S. 27, 31 (1916) (applying the Seventh Amendment to a statutory cause of action
in the antitrust context)
112. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558,
565–66 (1990) (observing that statutory rights “unknown in the 18th century” require the
court identify “an analogous cause of action”); see also James Fleming, Jr., Right to a Jury
Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 656 (1963) (noting that, because the Seventh
Amendment meant to preserve the jury trial applicability as it existed at the time of the
Amendment’s enactment, modern post-1791 statutory causes of action necessarily lack a
direct pre-1971 parallel and thus must rely upon identifying historically analogous causes of
action).
113. See Chauffers, 494 U.S. at 565 (citing Tull, 481 U.S. at 417–18 (1987) as a source
which describes the goal of the “historical test” as identifying modern statutory claims that
resolve “legal rights”).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 569 (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970)).
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equitable in nature.”116 Monetary relief is one example of a remedy that,
with limited exception, was traditionally offered in courts of law.117
It is important to note that the forgoing test, which serves as the
constitutional minimum for jury trial availability, was not altered with the
merger of law and equity.118 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt a
neutral stance on the issue and merely provide that “the
right[s] . . . declared in the Seventh Amendment . . . shall be preserved to
the parties in violate.”119 The Supreme Court has interpreted this language
as an attempt to preserve, not expand, the pre-merger right.120 Thus,
whether the post-merger cause of action seeks to resolve equitable or legal
rights remains the post-merger method of determining constitutional jury
trial availability.121
B. Decisions Shaping the Post-1989 Availability of the ERISA Jury Trial
While the law and equity distinction is important for determining the
scope of the constitutional jury trial, it is also important for understanding
the effect of the recent Supreme Court’s ERISA cases. Justice Scalia’s
narrow definition of “appropriate equitable relief” brought ERISA’s
distinction in line with the Seventh Amendment “historical test” and led to

116. Id. at 565.
117. See id. at 570–71 (noting that monetary relief might be characterized as an
equitable remedy when (1) restitutionary, such as the disgorgement of improper profits, or
(2) “incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief” (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 424
(1987)). The Court further retreated from this statement when it noted that, it has not been
“held that ‘any award of monetary relief is necessarily ‘legal’ relief.’” Id. (quoting Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974) (emphasis added)).
118. See Fleming, supra note112, at 686 (discussing how both the “framers of [the]
merged systems of procedure” took a “neutralist position toward [the] jury trial” in an
attempt to neither “contract nor expand it”).
119. Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(a).
120. See Chauffeurs v. Terry, 494 U.S. at 565 (noting that, after the merger of law and
equity, the court has carefully preserved the right to trial by jury in those circumstance where
it existed prior to merger and highlighting the firm place the jury trial holds in the history of
the United States).
121. See id. (“Since the merger of the systems of law and equity, the Court has
carefully preserved the right to trial by jury where legal rights are at stake.”). However, “if a
‘legal claim is joined with an equitable claim, the right to jury trial on the legal claim,
including all issues common to both claims, remains intact.’” Tull v. United States, 481 U.S.
412, 425 (1987) (quoting Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196 n.11 (1974)).
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Hellman’s ERISA stock drop jury trial award.122 The following is a brief
summary and analysis of the relevant Supreme Court precedent.123
1. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance v. Russell
The Supreme Court first addressed limitations on the remedies
available under section 502(a)(2) in Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. v.
Russell.124 The case involved a defined benefit disability plan beneficiary
who, after being denied and eventually reinstated welfare benefits for a
disabling back ailment, brought suit alleging individualized injury resulting
from the 132 day delay in benefit disbursements.125 Russell claimed that the
plan administrator’s actions constituted an actionable breach of fiduciary
duty under sections 409(a) and 502(a)(2).126
The Supreme Court disagreed and explained in a five-to-four opinion
authored by Justice Stevens that section “409 [does not] express[ly]
authori[ze] an award of extracontractual [or punitive] damages.”127 The
Court reasoned that the language of section 409, which stated that a
fiduciary is personally liable “‘to make good to such plan any losses to the
plan . . . and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which
have been made through use of assets of the plan,” evidenced a legislative
intent to limit recovery to the plan alone.128 After concluding that the
express language of section 409(a) only permitted “remedies that would
122. See infra Part IV (noting that both the Historical Test utilized for purposes of the
Seventh Amendment and ERISA traditional equity inquiry effectively asked the same twopronged question).
123. See infra notes 131–185.
124. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (finding that 502(a)(2)
does not support extra-contractual or punitive damages because the language of section 409
does not provide such a remedy for breach of fiduciary duty).
125. See id. at 136–37 (claiming that high-ranking company officials “(1) ignored
readily available evidence documenting [her] disability, (2) applied unwarrantedly strict
standards, and (3) deliberately took 132 days to process her claim”).
126. See id. at 134–35 (noting that the plaintiff brought suit alleging individualized
injury not injury to the welfare plan itself and despite the fact that the plan administrator
ensured retroactive benefits were paid in full).
127. Id. at 144.
128. See id. at 140 (quoting ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. 1109(a) (1974) (emphasis
added)). Also, the Court observed that “when the entire section [409] is examined, the
emphasis on the relationship between the fiduciary and the plan as an entity becomes
apparent.” Id.
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protect the entire plan,” the Court refused individualized relief because
ERISA’s “six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions”
represented “strong evidence that Congress did not intend to
authorize . . . remedies that it [failed to] . . . incorporate expressly.”129
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan explained that, while the express
language of section 409(a) indicated it did not support individualized extracontractual damages, the Court’s opinion should not be stretched to cover
section 502(a)(3).130 He also took issue with the majority’s characterization
of the ERISA scheme as “exhaustive” and argued that the statute’s remedial
goals compelled the conclusion that section 502(a)(3)’s provision for
“appropriate equitable relief” anticipated a broader definition through
which courts could craft new remedies necessary to “make [each plaintiff]
whole.”131 The concurrence pointed to legislative history as evidence that
congress intended to create a “federal common law” flexible enough to
address novel problems in the application of trust law to a pension system
and decrease socially unjust administrative risk.132
2. Bowen v. Massachusetts
A year after the Russell decision, Justice Scalia provided a glimpse
into the reasoning which would shape the Court’s later opinions in Bowen
v. Massachusetts.133 The case dealt with whether a federal court had
jurisdiction to review a final order by the Secretary of Heath and Human
129. Id. at 146; see also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571–74 (1979)
(“[W]here a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be
chary of reading others into it.”).
130. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 151 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (discussing his worry that the “dicta in the Court’s opinion” might mistakenly be
construed “as sweeping more broadly than the narrow ground of resolution set forth above”).
131. See id. at 155 (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining that section 502(a)(3) “can
only be read precisely as authorizing the federal courts to ‘fine-tune’ ERISA’s remedial
scheme”).
132. See id. at 156 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing the Senate Conference Report and
deriving a congressional intent that ERISA be “regarded . . . in a similar fashion to those
brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act” (LMRA) which
authorizes courts to fashion a body of federal law in the context of collective-bargaining
agreements).
133. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 913 (1988) (providing a narrower
view of the term “appropriate equitable relief” under ERISA which sharply contrasts to the
broader definition advocated by Justice Brennan in his Russell concurrence).

446

21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 425 (2015)

Services, and its resolution depended upon whether the plaintiff sought
money or specific relief.134 While not an ERISA opinion, the case serves as
a preview of Justice Scalia’s understanding of the distinction between law
and equity that underpins the analysis adopted by the Court in subsequent
ERISA cases.135 Justice Scalia urged the Court to ground its legal and
equitable relief distinction in the substance, not form, of the particular
claim.136 In an attempt to contrast the “two broad categories of judicial
relief,” he defined “damages” as “money awarded as reparation for injury
resulting from breach of [a] legal duty . . . . [which] compensates the
plaintiff for a loss” and contrasted that definition with “specific
relief . . . . [which] prevents or undoes a loss.”137 Unlike money damages,
which merely seek to compensate the plaintiff, specific relief involves an
order to “return to the plaintiff [] the precise property that has been
wrongfully taken, or [to] enjoin[] acts that would damage the plaintiff’s
person or property.”138 Finally, the dissent notes “suits seeking (whether by
judgment, injunction, or declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a sum
of money to the plaintiff are [usually] suits for ‘money damages.’”139 The
Court’s narrower definition of “specific relief” harkens to a pre-merger
substantive “equity” and sharply contrasts with the broader post-merger
understanding Justice Brennan advocated in Russell.140
3. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates
The tension between Bowen’s narrower definition and the Russell
dissent’s broader interpretation came to a head when the Supreme Court
134. See id. at 882 (describing the order as “refusing to reimburse a State for a category
of expenditures under its Medicaid program”).
135. See infra notes 167–217.
136. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. at 915–16 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
that “[i]t does not take much lawyerly inventiveness to convert a claim for payment of past
due sum (damages) into a prayer for an injunction against refusing to pay the sum”).
137. Id. at 914–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 915 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 918–19 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, the dissent mentions an exception
to this general rule when the sum of money is paid for incalculable future harm instead of
pass loss and provided the example of the threat of multiplicity of lawsuits generating no
adequate remedy at law. Id. at 918 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. See supra notes137–139 (describing Justice Brennan’s suggested meaning of
ERISA equitable relief, which, unlike Justice Scalia’s narrower pre-merger definition,
focused on the diverse relief available to a modern trust litigant).
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finally addressed the proper definition of section 502(a)(3) “equitable
relief” in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates.141 The case involved a class action
suit by Kaiser Steel Corporation (Kaiser) pension plan beneficiaries against
a third-party plan actuary who, after Kaiser phased out the steelmaking
operations, failed to change the actuary tables to properly reflect the
increased retirement costs.142 This failure would eventually cause the plan
to become under-funded and the substantial loss of benefits.143 Because the
plan actuary was not an ERISA plan fiduciary, the plaintiffs brought suit
seeking to hold Hewitt Associates “liable . . . as a nonfiduciary that
knowingly participated in the plan fiduciaries’ breach of their fiduciary
duties” under section 502(a)(3).144 Specifically, the plaintiffs sought
monetary relief for losses resulting to the plan and asked the Court to
fashion an appropriate remedy based upon the theory that it constituted
“other appropriate equitable relief” necessary to make whole the wronged
plaintiff.145
In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court rejected the
plaintiff’s argument and, after citing to Russell for the proposition that the
Court was “unwilling to infer causes of action,” found that 502(a)(3) does
not authorize suits for money damages against nonfiduciaries who
knowingly participate in a fiduciary’s breach.146 The Court reasoned that,
while both the broader definition meaning “all relief available for breach of
trust at common law” and narrower definition limiting available relief to
141. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 259 (1993) (finding that the plaintiff
could not hold the third party actuary liable under ERISA because such an action for
compensatory monetary relief was not available under section 502(a)(3)’s provisions for
“appropriate equitable relief”).
142. See id. at 250 (indicating that a plan actuary is not an affiliated entity with the
Kaiser Steel Corporation or plan administrator and is not a plan fiduciary despite ERISA’s
broad definition of that term).
143. See id. (noting that the beneficiaries received only limited benefits guaranteed by
ERISA section 1322 that were “substantially lower” than the fully vested pensions due
under the terms of the plan).
144. See id. at 251–53 (noting that 502(a)(2) was limited in applicability by its own
terms to plan fiduciaries).
145. See id. at 253–55 (utilizing an argument that appears to incorporate the broader
definition of “appropriate equitable relief espoused by Justice Brennan in his Russell
concurrence” and emphasis of ERISA’s roots in common-law trusts found in Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989)).
146. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 254–56 (noting that the plaintiffs substantively seek what
is effectively “compensatory damages” and not “a remedy traditionally viewed as
‘equitable,’ such as an injunction or restitution).
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only those “categories of relief that were typically available in equity” were
feasible, the latter definition required adoption to avoid rendering the
modifier “equitable” superfluous.147 The Court explained that
“injunction[s], mandamus and restitution” are examples of the typical
equitable relief made available through section 502(a)(3).148 Thus, Mertens
rejected Justice Brennan’s view that allowed courts to fashion a federal
common law by limiting the provision to remedies traditionally available in
pre-merger equity.149
The Mertens dissent, authored by Justice White, emphasized ERISA’s
trust law foundation and criticized the majority opinion for stripping
“ERISA trust beneficiaries of remed[ies] . . . which they enjoyed . . . [at]
common-law.”150 The dissent argued that the monetary relief should be
made available under section 502(a)(3) because the “‘equitable remedies’
available to a [modern post-merger] trust beneficiary included
compensatory damages.”151 In addition, the dissent disagreed with the
majority’s belief that the statutory distinction between “equitable” and
“remedial” relief in section 409(a) represented a congressional intent to
adopt the majority’s narrow definition.152
147. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 248, 256–59 (reasoning that modern courts sitting in
equity in an action regarding breach of trust could provide both legal and traditionally
equitable relief and such a definition would effectively place no limit on the relief available).
148. See id. at 256 (providing examples of relief traditionally available in a court of
equity prior to the merger of law and equity). However, Professor Langbein criticizes the
Court for failing to place enough focus on ERISA’s trust law roots and the inaccuracy of
these examples based upon the fact that mandamus was a classic form of writ only available
in courts of law. See Langbein, supra note 23, at 1320–21.
149. See supra notes 130–132 (illustrating that Justice Brennan’s articulation of
equitable relief necessarily encompassed broader remedial concepts than those available in
pre-merger chancery).
150. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 263 (1993) (White, J., dissenting)
(quoting Bruch, 489 U.S. at 114 for the proposition that the Court would not interpret
ERISA in a way which “would afford less protection to employees and their beneficiaries
than they enjoyed before ERISA was enacted”).
151. See id. at 266 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that equity for breach of common-law
trust sought to make the “breach whole” and “‘endeavor[ed] as far as possible to replace the
parties in the same situation as they would have been in, if no breach of trust had been
committed”).
152. See id. at 267–69 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress use both terms to
convey its intent that the federal courts retained the power to craft whatever relief was
necessary to make the beneficiary whole and did not intend to restrict the remedies available
to beneficiaries under common law). However, the majority countered this point by noting
that, even if the distinction is “artless” it is meaningful textual distinction that must be
observed. Id. at 259 n.8 (majority opinion). It is also important to note that neither the
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4. Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson
While Mertens served as a keystone for defining the scope of
“appropriate equitable relief,” the Court took another major jurisprudential
step in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson.153 The case
involved a claim by Great-West, the provider of an ERISA plan “stop-loss”
insurance agreement,154 for injunctive and declaratory relief under section
502(a)(3) to enforce the plan reimbursement provision under which the
beneficiary was liable for any benefit disbursement that was subsequently
recovered from a third party.155 The proceeds of the tort judgment that the
plaintiff sought to recover were, pursuant to California law, placed in a
“Special Needs Trust” for the benefit of the defendant.156
Justice Scalia again authored the five-to-four opinion of the Court,
which found against Great-West based upon its conclusion that the
requested relief was, in substance, “legal relief” unavailable under section
502(a)(3).157 Citing his dissent in Bowen, Justice Scalia explained that,
because the funds sought were in a special needs trust instead of in the
beneficiary’s possession, the plaintiff effectively sought “legal relief” by
imposition of personal liability for the plan enrollee’s breach of a legal
obligation to pay money.158 The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
he sought restitution encompassed by section 502(a)(3) by explaining that
majority nor dissent attempted to define “remedial relief.” Id. at 267 (White, J., dissenting).
153. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213–18 (2002)
(denying plaintiff’s requested relief based upon the fact that holding the beneficiary liable
for a legal obligation to pay with a claim against her general assets was restitution-at-law
outside section 502(a)(3)’s provision for “appropriate equitable relief).
154. See id. at 208 (explaining that the plan had “‘assigned to Great-West all of its
rights to make, litigate, negotiate, settle, comprise, release or waive’ any claim under the
reimbursement provision” and that the plan had paid welfare benefits to the beneficiary for
injuries received in a car accident).
155. See id. at 207 (explaining that the included reimbursement provision gives “‘the
right to recover from the [beneficiary] any payment for benefits’ paid by the plan that the
beneficiary is entitled to recover from a third party” and that the beneficiary recovered a tort
judgment against the third party involved in the accident).
156. See id. (explaining that the “Special Needs Trust” was purposed with caring for the
beneficiaries future medical expenses and was not under the direct control of the
beneficiary).
157. See id. at 204.
158. See id. at 210 (“‘Almost invariably . . . suits seeking (whether by judgment,
injunctions, or declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff
are suits for ‘money damages’ . . . [and] seek no more than compensation for [a] loss.”).
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restitution was a post-merger construct consisting of two distinct categories
of relief, legal restitution and equitable restitution.159 The Court clarified
that “‘restitution is a legal remedy when ordered in a case at law and an
equitable remedy . . . when ordered in an equity case.’”160 As such, claims
for restitution only constitute “equitable relief” when the plaintiff is able to,
either in the form of constructive trust or an equitable lien, assert title or
right to possession of particular funds or property wrongfully in the
possession of the defendant.161 In contrast, when a plaintiff is unable
identify particular assets, but is still able show grounds for recovering
money “to pay for some benefit the defendant received,” he has a claim for
restitution at law in the form of quasi-contract or contract implied-in-law.162
Thus, similar to the Seventh Amendment “historical test” whether a claim
for restitution is legal or equitable depends on its substance, that is the basis
of the claim and nature of the underlying remedy, not its form.163 Justice
Scalia explained that this determination would rarely require more than a
reference to the “standard current works.”164
Both Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsberg filed separate dissents in
Great-West.165 Noting that the majority test mirrored the Seventh
Amendment “historical test,” Justice Ginsberg took issue with the assertion
that Congress intended to invoke a pre-1791 law and equity inquiry for a
statute passed in 1974.166 Attempting to provide some flexibility in the
159. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S at 212 (explaining that “[i]n the
days of the divided bench, restitution was available in certain cases at law, and in certain
others in equity”).
160. Id. at 213 (quoting Reich v. Continental Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Posner, J.)).
161. See id. at 213–14 (noting that where “‘the property [sought to be recovered] or its
proceeds have been dissipated so that no product remains, [the plaintiff’s] claim is only that
of a general creditor’” and sounds only at law).
162. See id. at 213 (explaining that restitution-at-law derived form the common-law
writ of assumpsit and was considered “legal relief” because it sought to impose mere
personal liability for a sum of money).
163. See id. at 214 (emphasis added).
164. See id. at 217 (identifying Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements as
“standard current works” and nothing that the same inquiry is required in the context of the
Seventh Amendment).
165. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 222–34 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (Justice Stevens wrote separately to discuss what he believed to be Congress’s
intended meaning of the work “enjoin” as used in section 502(a)(3)(A)).
166. See id. at 224–27 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s “fanciful”
interpretation, when combined with the effects of ERISA’s pre-emption of state causes of
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Mertens rule, the dissent argued that because Great-West sought a form of
restitution and restitution is generally available in equity, it should fall
within the definition of “appropriate equitable relief.”167
5. Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services
The Court applied the Great-West test again, this time reaching the
opposite conclusion, in Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services.168 The
case involved a suit for enforcement of a plan reimbursement provision
after a beneficiary, to whom the plan had issued benefit payments for
injuries received in an automobile wreck, recovered $750,000 from a third
party.169 This time, the plan fiduciary brought a claim under section
502(a)(3) which sought to enforce the terms of the plan and collect
$74,869.37 of the settlement for the plan beneficiary’s medical expenses.170
While the case was pending before the District Court, the beneficiary
agreed to place $74,869.37 of the settlement in a separate account held by
the beneficiary pending final resolution of the issue.171 The defendant
action, sacrifices Congress’s stated purpose of increasing beneficiary protections to an
“archaic and unyielding doctrine”).
167. See id. at 228 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (arguing that this interpretation of
“equitable relief” is consistent with congressional intent and that the Court’s previous
decision in Mertens was not limited to relief exclusively available in equity). However,
Justice Scalia countered that such vague notions of congressional intent could not override
clear statutory language. Id. at 217–18 (majority opinion) (observing that the distinction is
“specified by statute” and that such specification necessitates the Court’s distinction
“between law and equity”).
168. See Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs. Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 360–63 (2006) (applying
the same rule from Great-West but finding that the claim was to restitution at equity within
the scope of section 502(a)(3) because it constituted a traceable claim to funds in the
defendant’s possession which belonged in good conscious to the plaintiff).
169. See id. at 360 (explaining that the beneficiaries, the Sereboffs, received a benefits
disbursement from the welfare plan administrator pursuant to the plans coverage provisions
and that the beneficiaries subsequently recovered a monetary award for future medical
expenses in a tort action).
170. See id. at 361 (observing that, because there was no dispute that Mid Atlantic was
a plan fiduciary and that the suit was to enforce the terms of the plan, the only issue before
the Court was “whether the relief . . . requested . . . was ‘equitable relief’ under” section
502(a)(3)(B)).
171. See id. at 360 (noting Sereboff’s attorney had already distributed the $750,000
settlement to the defendants and that, in response to a request of temporary injunctive relief
by the plan administrator, the parties stipulated to place the money is a special account until
the case was resolved).
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argued the remedy sought, enforcement of a contractual obligation to pay
money, was not “typically available in equity” prior to the merger.172
Chief Justice Roberts authored the opinion of the court, which rejected
the defendant’s argument and clarified the court’s holding in Great-West.173
After reiterating that the true test of whether relief is “legal or equitable
depends on ‘the basis for [the plaintiff’s] claim and the nature of the
underlying remedies sought,”174 the Court explained that, unlike the facts in
Great-West, Mid Atlantic sought reimbursement of specifically identified
funds which were separate from the defendant’s “general assets.”175 As a
result, while the action was for breach of contract and payment of money,
the remedy sought was in substance an equitable lien, which is a form of
restitution that Great-West identified as “typically available in equity.”176
Reflection on the evolution of Supreme Court doctrine addressing
ERISA’s remedial regime reveals a tension between recognizing what
appeared to be a congressional intent to preserve pre-merger substantive
equity’s remedial structure and the remedial social justice motivations that
inspired the statute’s trust law model.177 It was against this backdrop that
our study case found a constitutional right to a jury trial.178

172. See id. at 364 (arguing that the suit would not have satisfied the “strict tracing
rules” of equitable restitution prevalent in the days of the divided bench).
173. See id. at 363 (explaining that the “Court in [Great-West] did not reject GreatWest’s suit out of hand because it alleged a breach of contract and sought money, but
because Great-West did not seek to recover a particular fund from the defendant”).
174. Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs. Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 363 (quoting Great-West Life
& Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002)).
175. See id. at 362 (explaining that Great-West failed to involve an equitable lien
because the funds claimed by Great-West were not in a “Special Needs Trust” instead of the
possession of the beneficiary).
176. See id. at 363 (noting that because ERISA provides for “equitable remedies to
enforce plan terms,” the fact that the action involves a breach of contract is not sufficient to
prove the relief sought is not equitable). To support this point, the Court cited the pre-merger
case Barnes v. Alexander to show that the basis of Mid Atlantic’s claim had long been
recognized as a “familiar rul[e] of equity.” See id. at 363 (quoting Barnes v. Alexander, 232
U.S. 117, 121 (1914) as proof that it is a “‘familiar rul[e] of equity that a contract to covey a
specific object even before it is acquired will make the contractor a trustee as soon as he gets
a title to the thing’”).
177. See generally supra Parts II & III.
178. See generally infra Part IV.

REVIVAL OF SUBSTANTIVE EQUITY

453

IV. A Jury Trial & A Study Case: Hellman v. Catalado179
Theodore J. Hellman, an employee of CPI Corp. (“CPI”) and
beneficiary of CPI’s 401(k) plan, brought suit as representative plaintiff in a
“stock-drop” class action against plan administrators, including defendant
Renato Cataldo, for breach of fiduciary duty.180 Because CPI’s pension plan
involved a defined contribution scheme, the size of the retirement
disbursement depended upon the investment success of the various
individual beneficiary accounts.181 The complaint alleged that, despite
knowledge of the company’s poor fiscal condition, the plan administrators
continued to permit plan beneficiaries to invest their employer contributions
in CPI common stock, which resulted in a loss of pension benefits.182 The
plaintiff argued that that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties of
prudence and loyalty, giving rise to liability under section 409(a), when
they:
(a) . . . fail[ed] to act to protect the Plan and its participants despite
knowledge of the CPI’s dire financial condition; (b) . . . continu[ed] to
offer CPI common stock as an investment option under the Plan when it
was imprudent to do so; and (c) . . . maintain[ed] the Plan’s pre-existing
heavy investment in CPI stock when it was no longer a prudent
investment.183

The action sought “an order compelling Defendants to restore to the Plan all
profits that the participants would have made if the Defendants had not
breached their fiduciary obligations.”184 In addition, the plaintiff requested a
jury trial based upon a belief that the requested recovery sought “legal
relief.”185
179. See Hellman v. Cataldo, No. 4:12CVo2177 AGF, 2013 WL 4482889, at *4 (E.D.
Mo. Aug. 20, 2013) (concluding that the requested relief was restitution-at-law and that the
Seventh Amendment requires the availability of the jury trial).
180. See id. at *1 (explaining that the relevant plan was an “employee benefit plan”
within the meaning of ERISA § 3(2)(A) and that the plaintiff proceeded individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated).
181. See generally supra notes 50–56.
182. See Hellman, 2013 WL 4482889, at *1–2 (noting that the plaintiff originally
brought suit against both CPI Corp. and the plan fiduciaries but the claims against CPI were
dismissed after CPI declared bankruptcy).
183. See id. (citing ERISA §§ 404(a) and 405 as the sources of the breached fiduciary
obligations).
184. Id. at *2.
185. Id.
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Despite prior Eighth Circuit precedent suggesting that ERISA does not
provide for a jury trial,186 the district court concluded that “no . . . precedent
squarely address[ed] . . . whether the Seventh Amendment affords a
plaintiff the right to a jury trial where a beneficiary alleges violation of
fiduciary duties and seeks restitution or money damages from the
fiduciaries under [section 502(a)(2)].”187 The District Court went on to deny
the Defendants’ motion and conclude that, in light of modern developments
in ERISA case law, the plaintiff sought legal relief entitled to a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment.188 The district court based its reasoning on
the Supreme Court’s two-step test in Great-West.189 The first prong was
found to weigh in the favor of equity since, based upon ERISA’s trust law
foundation, the most analogous “18th-century action[]” would have been a
common law breach of trust “traditionally within the jurisdiction of courts
of equity.”190 The second “weightier prong” of the test however indicated
that the plaintiff sought “compensation for a loss resulting from [the]
Defendants’ [fiduciary] breach.”191 Citing Great-West’s statement that a
“judgment imposing a merely personal liability upon the defendant to pay a
sum of money’ in return for ‘some benefit that the defendant had received
from him’ seeks restitution at law,” the court concluded Hellman failed to
identify traceable property belong to him in good conscious and, as a result,
sought legal restitution.192 Finally, to distinguish the case from the Eight
Circuit’s previous finding in In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 322 (1982), in
which the court found monetary relief turning on a determination of
186. See In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 321 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding no right to a jury
trial in an action brought under § 502(a)(1)(B) and § 502(a)(3)); see also Langlie v. Onan
Corp., 192 F.3d 1137, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999) (evaluating a § 510 claim and stating that “no
right to a jury trial [exists] under ERISA”).
187. See Hellman v. Cataldo, No. 4:12CVo2177 AGF, 2013 WL 4482889, at *3 (E.D.
Mo. Aug. 20, 2013) (noting that district courts within the Eighth Circuit had reached
differing conclusions on the issue).
188. See id. at *4–5 (ruling only on the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s
request for a jury trial and permitting the issue to move forward to trial on the merits).
189. See id. at *4 (utilizing the Seventh Amendment Granfinanciera test adopted by
Great-West as the proper to identify “equitable relief” under ERISA).
190. See id. (citing Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494
U.S. 558, 567 (1990) for the as evidence that actions for breach of fiduciary duty “‘were
within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of equity”).
191. Id.
192. See id. (citing White v. Martin, No. Civ. 99–1447, 2002 WL 598432, at *4 (D.
Minn. Apr. 12, 2002) as holding that no jury trial right existed under § 502(a)(2) when the
plan sues a fiduciary for breach of duty in liquidating plan assets, but failed to address it).
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benefits to be equitable, the district court observed that the action before it
“turn[ed] on the question of fiduciary duty, not entitlement to benefits.”193
V. Analysis & Critique of Hellman v. Cataldo
Hellman’s conclusion that stock drop actions seek legal relief entitled
to a constitutional jury trial gives rise to two questions:194 (1) whether the
monetary recovery can constitute “legal relief” when recoverable only “to
the plan” instead of “to the plaintiff” and (2) if so, whether the court erred
in its categorization under Great-West.
A. Relationship Between Seventh Amendment and ERISA Tests
Whereas ERISA’s definition of relief “typically available in equity”
hinges on the basis of the claim and nature of the remedy, the Seventh
Amendment identifies an analogous pre-merger cause of action prior to an
investigation of the nature of the recovery sought.195 Because the two tests
effectively undertake the same inquiry and are unlikely to produce differing
results,196 a cause of action determined to be equitable for the purposes of

193. See Hellman, 2013 WL 4482889, at *4. (utilizing the same reasoning that allowed
the district court to independently frame the issue presented as uniquely addressing 502(a)(2)
so as to avoid conflict with prior Eighth Circuit decisions on the availability of an ERISA
jury trial).
194. See generally supra notes 195–261.
195. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993) (finding the action was
not supported by 502(a)(3) because the cause of action was not on “traditionally available in
equity”); see also Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002)
(determining that the restitution sought was not traditionally available in equity by looking
to the basis of the claim and nature of the remedy); Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers,
Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565–66 (1990) (evaluating whether an action is legal
relief as foreseen by the Seventh Amendment by utilizing the two step test utilized by the
Court in Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417–18 (1987)).
196. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 180 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting)
(arguing that preserving founding-era provisions, such as the Seventh Amendment meaning
of “equitable,” does not justify using the same historical analysis to determine its meaning
under a modern statute passed in 1794). The majority also indicated that the inquiry under
the test they were establishing in Great-West is the same as in the Seventh Amendment
context when they listed Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) as an example of other areas
where the court had relied upon “standard common works” to determine if relief was legal or
equitable. Id. at 217 (majority opinion).
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ERISA is also equitable for the purposes of the Seventh Amendment.197 It
logically follows that, because every action must be either equitable or
legal, an action falling outside of ERISA’s definition of “traditional
equitable relief” constitutes legal relief in the eyes of the Seventh
Amendment.198
B. Can Relief Restricted “to the plan” be Legal Relief?
Although the ERISA progeny began with Russell’s restrictive
interpretation of section 409(a), by 2008, a majority of the cases revolved
around section 502(a)(3).199 The Court eventually revisited its prior
conclusion that section 502(a)(2) only supports actions brought “by the
plan” for recovery to the “entire plan” in LaRue v. DeWolf, Boberg &
Associates.200 When faced with the question of whether a defined
contribution plan participant could hold a fiduciary personally liable under
502(a)(2) for losses incurred when the administrator failed to follow the
beneficiary’s investment instructions, the Court explained that “although
[section] 502(a)(2) does not provide a remedy for individual injuries
distinct form plan injuries, [it] does authorize recovery for fiduciary
breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant’s individual
account.”201 Thus, while Russell is still good law in the direct benefit plan
context, its narrow holding is not applicable to defined contribution
plans.202 The differing results are justified by the nature of defined
contribution plans, in which benefit disbursements vary with the investment
success of individualized accounts instead of invariable distributions from a
197. See id. (Ginsberg J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s utilization of a test
similar to the Seventh Amendment similarly freezes the statutory definition of “equity” in a
similar fashion).
198. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41 (1989) (defining suits
involving legal relief as, “in contradiction to those where equitable rights alone are
recognized”).
199. See generally supra Part III.
200. See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assoc., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 254–55 (2008)
(recognizing a shift toward utilization of the defined contribution plan over the defined
benefit plan).
201. Id. at 256.
202. See id. at 255 (explaining that the “entire plan” language in Russell was directed at
plans with a defined benefits payment scheme because administrator misconduct would “not
affect an individuals’ entitlement to a defined benefit unless it creates or enhances the risk of
default” to the entire plan.)
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single-employer held defined benefit fund,203 and the fact that the modern
pension landscape starkly contrasts with that which existed when Russell
was decided.204
Justice Thomas authored a concurrence agreeing with the Court’s
result but criticizing the majority’s reasoning.205 He explained that it was
unnecessary to rely upon ERISA’s contemporary shift towards defined
contribution plans because the plaintiff stated “a cognizable claim flow[ing]
from the unambiguous text of [sections] 409 and 502(a)(2).”206 As a result,
because “all assets allocated to the petitioner’s individual account were plan
assets,” individualized recovery for losses to those individual accounts
satisfied section 409(a)’s requirement that a “recovery [be] for the plan.” 207
The concurrence took care to note that recovery under 502(a)(2) remained
restricted “to the plan,” which in a defined benefit context includes all
individually held accounts containing plan assets, and not the beneficiary
personally.208 This language begins to look like an attempt to pre-empt the
jury trial issue once one realizes that Justice Scalia previously stated that
“‘[a]lmost invariably . . . suits seeking . . . to compel the defendant to pay a

203. See id. at 254 (explaining in defined contribution plans “fiduciary misconduct need
not threaten the solvency of the entire plan to reduce benefits below the amounts that
participants would otherwise receive”)
204. See id. at 254–55 (noting that the “[d]efined contribution plans dominate the
retirement plan scene today” and that the holding in Russell’s emphasis on protection the
“entire plan” from fiduciary misconduct reflects the former landscape).
205. See id. at 262 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that the majority erred in its
reliance on the “trends in the pension plan market” and “ostensible ‘concerns’ of ERISA’s
drafters”).
206. See LaRue, 552 U.S. at 261–62 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that “Congress’
repeated use of the word ‘any’ in [section] 409(a) clarifies that the key factor” to qualifying
for the remedial provision “is whether the alleged losses can be said to be losses ‘to the
plan’”).
207. See id. at 262 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that a “defined contribution
plan is not merely a collection of unrelated accounts,” but instead a combination of plan
“assets . . . held in trust and legally owned by the plan trustees”).
208. See id. at 261 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that section 502(a)(2) only
authorizes recovery “to the plan”).
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sum of money to the plaintiff are suits for money damages’”209 and that
“money damages are . . . the classic form of legal relief.”210
The question that naturally arises from the forgoing analysis is whether
an action seeking lost profits for breach of fiduciary duty can constitute
legal relief when recovery is limited “to the plan” instead of directly “to the
plaintiff.”211 While LaRue informs us that beneficiaries can “recover for
fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant’s
account,” it does not resolve the question of whether such recovery is the
equivalent of recovery “to the plaintiff” for purposes of the Seventh
Amendment.212
In light of the existing Supreme Court precedent, the fact that section
409 requires recovery “to the plan” should not prevent the action from
qualifying as “legal relief.”213 In fact, the nature of a defined contribution
plan and the LaRue majority’s analysis suggest that recovery “to the plan”
and “to the plaintiff” can be considered equivalents.214 Because CPI’s plan
consisted of individual participant accounts subject to individual gains and
losses instead of a single employer held fund, any monetary recovery is
directly payable to an individual account.215 Because each defined
209. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002)
(quoting Brown v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 918–919 (1988) (emphasis added)); see
also Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs. Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 364 (2002) (describing monetary
relief as equitable restitution only when it seeks a distinguishable set of funds distinct from
the defendant’s “general assets”).
210. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 210 (quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at
255 (1993)).
211. See ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. 1109(a) (1974) (providing that the fiduciary shall
be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan); see also LaRue, 552
U.S. at 256 (finding that section 409, in the defined contribution context, supports an action
by plan beneficiaries for injuries to plan assets held in their individual accounts but not
directly addressing the fact that any award would still be required to be paid “to the plan”).
212. See LaRue, 552 U.S. at 261 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that a defined benefit
plan “is not merely a collection of unrelated accounts[,]” but rather the sum of all assets
allocated for bookkeeping purposes to the participants’ individual accounts); see also 29
U.S.C. § 1002(34) (defining a “defined contribution plan” as a “plan which provides
individual accounts for each participant”); 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (requiring that “all assets of
an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by one or more trustees”).
213. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985) (demonstrating
section 409’s repeated use of the limiting phrase “to the plan”).
214. See PRATT & REECE, supra note 39, at 16 (“Under a defined contribution plan, all
amounts contributed to the plan on behalf of an employee are credited to one or more
accounts in his name.”).
215. See LaRue, 552 U.S. at 248 (explaining that section 502(a)(2) authorizes recovery
for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets held in a participants individual
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contribution beneficiary necessarily has some “right, title or interest in the
amounts” in his own account, recovery should be viewed as analogous to
direct compensation.216
It is also important to note that the Great-West and Seventh
Amendment tests hinge on the origin of the money sought and not on the
ultimate depository of the eventual award.217 Specifically, the inquiry
requires courts look to see if the request sought restoration of “‘particular
[traceable] funds’ now in the Defendants’ possession”218 or funds
indistinguishable from the defendants’ “general assets.”219 Because the
judgment recipient is never mentioned, the fact that the recovery is limited
“to the plan” should not have any effect on whether the relief embodied in
such award is equitable or legal.220
Accepting the above arguments and presuming section 409(a) is found
to support actions for legal relief, it becomes clear that monetary recovery

account).
216. See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 581 F.2d 729, 733 (1978) (finding a
particular pension plan was not a defined contribution plan because, while a record of
contributions received to each participant were maintained by the Trustees, participants had
no right, title or interest in those amounts).
217. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002)
(describing the determination of whether an action for monetary relief is equitable or legal as
focused on whether it merely sought to impose “personal liability” or “traced . . . particular
funds or property in the defendant’s possession”); see also Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs.
Inc., 547 U.S. 356–58 (2002) (clarifying the focus of the Great-West test and failing to
mention the ultimate depository of the potential award as relevant to that inquiry).
218. Hellman v. Cataldo, No. 4:12CVo2177 AGF, 2013 WL 4482889, at *4 (E.D. Mo.
Aug. 20, 2013); see also Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 213 (explaining
that restitution at law derived from the common-law writ of assumpsit because it sought “to
obtain a judgment imposing a merely personal liability upon the defendant to pay a sum of
money”).
219. See Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 357 (highlighting the fact that the targeted money were
identifiable, and particular funds within the defendant’s possession distinct from his “general
assets” as proof the action was equitable).
220. See ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. 1109(a) (1974) (providing that the fiduciary shall
be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan (emphasis added)); see
also LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 256 (2008) (finding that
section 409, in the defined contribution context, supports an action by plan beneficiaries for
injuries to plan assets held in their individual accounts but not directly addressing the fact
that any award would still be required to be paid “to the plan”); see also Great-West Life &
Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 212 (drawing the distinction between restitution at law and
restitution at equity as based upon the plaintiff’s ability to assert “title or right to particular
property” and not mentioning the ultimate depository or relief as relevant to such inquiry).
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to a participant’s defined contribution account could potentially be, and is
not inconsistent with, characterization as “legal relief.”221
C. Did the District Court Err in Light of CIGNA Corp. v. Amara?
Prior to the Supreme Court’s most recent case in CIGNA Corp. v.
Amara,222 lower courts frequently split on the question of whether relief
sought under sections 409(a) and 502(a)(2) constitutionally require a jury
trial and demonstrate a wide diversity of reasoning in answering the
question.223 In CIGNA, when faced with the question of whether plan
beneficiaries could force a plan administrator to distribute benefits in
accordance with the original terms of an illegally reformed plan, the Court
suggested in dicta that, because “a suit by a beneficiary against a plan
fiduciary (whom ERISA typically treats as a trustee) about the terms of a
plan (which ERISA typically treats as a trust)” would have been actionable
in equity during the days of the divided bench,224 section 502(a)(3)’s catchall provision might authorize the necessary relief.225 Any accompanying
remedy would also be equitable due to the fact that “equity chancellors
developed a host of . . . ‘distinctively equitable’ remedies—remedies that
were ‘fitted to the nature of the primary right.’”226 The Court noted
ERISA’s trust law origin and explained that monetary recovery in such a
situation would not necessarily prevent the remedy from constituting
traditionally equitable relief because “[pre-merger] equity courts possessed
221. See supra Part V, Section B (examining whether relief which is only payable “to
the plan” can amount to “legal relief” for purposes of the Seventh Amendment).
222. 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011).
223. Compare Abbot v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 06-cv-0701-MJR, 2007 WL
2316481, at *3 (S.D. Ill. 2007) (focusing on the liability arising due to fiduciary breach and
noting that the “great weight of authority in federal courts hold . . . that ERISA
actions . . . are equitable in nature for purposes of the Seventh Amendment”), with Chao v.
Meixner, No. 1:07-cv-0595-WSD, 2007 WL 4225069, at *5 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (citing GreatWest as compelling the conclusion that the plaintiff sought legal relief because it fell within
the rubric of restitution at law).
224. See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1879 (2011) (citing LaRue v.
DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 253 (2008)).
225. See id. at 1876–77 (concluding that the district court ordered two steps of relief
and that only the second, enforcing the reformed terms of the plan, was consistent with relief
available under section 502(a)(1)(B)).
226. Id. at 1879 (quoting 1 S. SYMONS, POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 108 (5th
ed. 1941)).
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the power to [award] . . . monetary ‘compensation’ for a loss resulting from
a trustee’s breach of duty.”227 Thus, in a suit seeking make whole relief,
“the fact that the defendant is, unlike the defendant in Mertens, analogous
to a trustee [constitutes] a critical difference” for purposes of the Seventh
Amendment.228
LaRue makes clear that Hellman’s request, which sought restoration to
the Plan of all profits that would have accrued absent the CPI 401(k) plan
administrators’ failure to follow investment instructions, amounts to an
action for “lost profits.”229 As Part II of this Note explains, whether such
action constitutes relief “typically available in equity,” i.e., equitable relief
outside the scope of the Seventh Amendment, depends on a substantive
examination of the basis of the claim and the nature of the remedy.230
Applying the first prong of this test, it appears that the basis of
Hellman’s action is the breach of a fiduciary duty.231 This conclusion is
supported by the analysis of Part IB of this Note and the fact that scholars
have consistently indicated that section 502(a)(2) is grounded in the
common law of trusts; which traditionally arose in courts of equity during
the days of the divided bench.232 Thus, the first factor weighs in favor of
227. See id. at 1880 (observing that prior to the merger of law and equity this kind of
monetary remedy against a trustee, often called a surcharge, was “exclusively equitable”).
228. See id.
229. See Hellman v. Cataldo, No. 4:12CVo2177 AGF, 2013 WL 4482889, at *4 (E.D.
Mo. Aug. 20, 2013) (explaining that the plaintiff seeks “declaratory relief, recovery of
profits, and the imposition of a constructive trust on funds in Defendants’ possession”); see
also LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 253 n.4 (2008) (explaining
that actions for lost profits fall squarely within the scope of relief available under sections
409(a) and 502(a)(2)); see also ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1974) (“[F]iduciary .
. . shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from
each such breach.”(emphasis added)).
230. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214 (2002)
(basing its determination that the restitution sought was restitution at law based upon
analysis of the basis of the claim and the substantive nature of the relief sought); see also
supra notes 167–82 and accompanying text.
231. See Hellman, 2013 WL 4482889, at *1 (describing the claim for lost profits, which
was the focus of the court’s analysis in determining the applicability of the Seventh
Amendment, was brought under ERISA section 502(a)(2) for breach of fiduciary duty giving
rise to personal liability of the fiduciary under section 409(a)).
232. See supra Part II, section B; see also CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866,
1879 (2011) (explaining that lawsuits by a beneficiary against a fiduciary could have been
brought only in a court of equity prior to the merger of law and equity); see also Mertens v.
Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 258 (1993) (recognizing the common law trust foundation of
claims for breach of fiduciary duty); see also Ehlen Floor Covering, Inc. v. Lamb, No. 2:07cv-666-FtM-29DNF, 2012 WL 1698352, at *2 (citing Pereria v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 338
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finding that the relief sought is equitable and not within the scope of the
Seventh Amendment.233
Next, a consideration of the second factor becomes necessary:
“whether the nature of the remedy sought is legal or equitable.”234 The
inquiry is consistent with recognition of the fact that, while breach of
fiduciary duty cases are “historically and substantively equitable,”
corresponding post-merger remedies “might be legal.”235 Because the
“contours of the term [equitable relief] are well known,” such a
determination rarely takes more than an examination of the standard current
works—i.e., “Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements.”236 Hellman,
however, fails to make reference to these materials or Justice Breyer’s dicta
in CIGNA which suggests an order that requires a fiduciary “compensat[e]”
a beneficiary for losses resulting from a breach of his duties historically fell
within a set of “‘distinctively equitable’ remedies . . . that were ‘fitted to the
nature of the primary right’ they were intended to protect.”237 The omission
is critical because the relief sought, an injunction requiring CPI plan
administrators to restore profits lost incurred as a result of their fiduciary
breach, resembles an equitable pre-merger remedy known as a surcharge.238
A comparison of pre-merger trust remedies confirms the error.239
(2d Cir. 2005) for the proposition that actions for breach of fiduciary duty were within the
jurisdiction of equity courts prior to the merger of law and equity); see also Choa v.
Meixner, No. 1:07-cv-0595-WSD, 2007 WL 4225069, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 27, 2007)(“[A]s
a general rule, breach of fiduciary duty claims were historically within the jurisdiction of the
equity courts.”); see also Abbott v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 06-cv-0701-MJR, 2007 WL
2316481, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2007) (recognizing that the action for breach of fiduciary
duty had an historically analogous action in pre-merger equity).
233. See CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1879 (shifting its analysis to the second prong of GreatWest in a way that indicates its conclusion that breach of fiduciary duty actions indicate the
relief sought is equitable).
234. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 213 (quoting Reich v. Cont’l Cas.
Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.) (emphasis added)).
235. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 2.6(3)
(2d ed. 1993) (recognizing that courts in the past have found that a plaintiff seeking merely
to recover monetary relief (assumpsit) or the return of a chattel to which he holds legal title
(replevin) are restitutionary remedies “at law”).
236. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 217 (claiming that this static
definition will be less confusing that the “rolling revision” of the term “equity” suggested by
the dissents).
237. See CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1879–80 (quoting 1 S. SYMONS, POMEROY’S EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 180 (5th ed. 1941)).
238. See Hellman v. Cataldo, No. 4:12CVo2177 AGF, 2013 WL 4482889, at *4 (E.D.
Mo. Aug. 20, 2013) (applying the second prong of the Great-West test, after determining
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As the CIGNA majority observed, the fact that an action for lost
profits “takes the form of a money payment does not [necessarily] remove it
from the category of traditional equitable relief” because liability from the
fiduciary defendant’s breach supports a fundamentally and substantively
equitable remedy.240 Specifically, in the days of the divided bench a
surcharge allowed a trust beneficiary to recover monetary relief from his
fiduciary for any harm that resulted from that fiduciary’s breach of duty. 241
The equitable nature of such recovery is further supported by the standard
current works, which provide that compensatory payments were frequently
ordered pursuant to either restitution or in the exercise of equity powers.242
Closer examination reveals that the surcharge remedy stands wholly
independent from the concept of restitution.243 Despite the fact that
recognition of this fact is fundamental to correct remedial categorization of
section 409(a)’s lost profits remedy, a proper understanding of the nuanced
relationship continues to elude many courts.244 While pre-merger trust law
permitted recovery of non-traceable monetary sums in conjunction with the
restitutionary action of accounting, which frequently took the form of
interest accrued to traceable property that was itself unreachable by
constructive trust or equitable lien, several circuits have indicated that
scope of the “surcharge” remedy extended beyond this context.245 One such
that the first prong weighed in favor of equity, without reference to CIGNA).
239. See supra Part II, section B (highlighting the trust law foundation of the ERISA
fiduciary provisions).
240. See CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1880 (explaining that, prior to the merger of law and
equity, actions seeking money payment as relief for a loss resulting from a trustee’s breach
of duty, or to prevent the trustee’s unjust enrichment were “‘exclusively equitable’”). In
addition, the court noted that the pre-merger court in equity has the “power to . . . surcharge”
a fiduciary with losses incurred to the plan. Id. (citing to Princess Lida of Thurn and Taxis
v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 464 (1939)).
241. See id. (citing to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 201(1957) for support).
242. See DOBBS, supra note 235, § 3.1, at 278 n.5 (explaining that some kinds of money
awards are not traditionally referred to as damages for historical reasons).
243. See Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 1013 (2004)
(discussing restitution in the form of “accounting for profits” as a traditionally equitable
remedy recognized prior to the merger of law and equity within the meaning of ERISA
“equitable relief”).
244. See e.g., Ehlen Floor Covering, Inc. v. Lamb, No. 2:07-cv-666-FtM-29DNF, 2012
WL 1698351, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 14, 2012) (concluding that the relief sought by the
409(a)(2) lost profits plaintiffs was equitable in nature because “plaintiffs seek restitution,
which is typically an equitable remedy”).
245. See DOBBS, supra note 235, § 4.3(5), at 608 (noting that accounting of profits
could recover monetary sums which were not traceable to the defendant’s possession if they
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example is the fact that all pre-merger actions for breach of fiduciary duty
supported a “make whole” award of monetary compensation for any profits
that the trust failed to realize as a consequence of breach.246 While the
recovery of both the accrued interest and lost profits were treated as forms
of “‘surcharge’ because [in both instances] the trustee was ‘chargeable’ for
the recovery on top of the trust balance reflected in his accounting,” 247
unlike an action for accounting of profits, which itself is a form of
restitution, the latter remedy constituted a form of non-restitutionary
relief.248 Thus, while it is true that restitution only “holds the defendant
liable for his profits . . . [instead of the plaintiff’s] damages,”249 monetary
compensation acquired through surcharge of a fiduciary is not bound by
this principal because recovery is completely distinct from the concepts of
restitution and legal relief.250
were attributable to the use of property which belonged in good conscious to him); see also
Kenseth v. Dean Health Plan, Inc., 722 F.3d 869, 878–880 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that
CIGNA fundamentally changed the court’s understanding of “equitable relief” available
under ERISA in that monetary compensation does not automatically mean the remedy is
“legal” rather than “equitable” and explaining the pre-merger equitable origin of the
surcharge); see also Gearlds v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 709 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2013)
(remanding the case to the district court for consideration of whether the remedy sought in
substance constitutes surcharge and rejecting the conclusion that all monetary relief is
outside the scope of “equitable relief”); see also McCravy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 690 F.3d
176 (4th Cir. 2012) (concluding that the district court erred by limiting relief to premiums
wrongfully withheld by the fiduciary when surcharge “make whole” relief was traditional
equitable relief); see also Skinner v. Northrop Grumman Ret. Plan B, 673 F.3d 1162, 1167
(9th Cir. 2012) (describing the surcharge as a remedy capable holding a fiduciary liable for
either benefits gained through unjust enrichment or compensatory monetary relief for harm
resulting from its breach).
246. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 95 (2012) (“If a breach of trust causes a
loss, including any failure to realize income, capital gain, or appreciation that would have
resulted from proper administration, the beneficiaries . . . may have the trustee surcharged
for the amount necessary to compensate fully for the consequences of the breach.”); see also
CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1880 (2011) (describing the lost profits recovery
as “make whole” relief).
247. .See MARY ELLEN SIGNORILLE & RAVEN MERLAU, CIGNA CORPORATION V. AMARA:
A WHOLE NEW WORLD, ALI-ABA 159, 164 (2011).
248. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 862 (rev. 2d
ed. 1995) (“For a breach of trust the trustee may be directed . . . to pay damages to the
beneficiary out of the trustee’s own funds, either for that purpose or on an accounting where
the trustee is surcharged beyond the amount of his admitted liability.” (emphasis added)).
249. DOBBS, supra note 235, § 4.3(5), at 611.
250. See CHARLES E. ROUNDS, JR., & CHARLES E. ROUNDS, III, LORING AND ROUNDS: A
TRUSTEES HANDBOOK 698–99 (2014 ed.) (describing the potential monetary liability as either
damages, restitution, or surcharge and describing surcharge as non-traceable monetary
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The development of an “exclusively equitable” source of
compensatory relief is not surprising because, for much of the trust’s
existence, equity was the sole forum to recognize the trust relationship.251
As a result, recognition of surcharge as a stand-alone substantive form of
traditionally equitable relief stays true to both the trust law foundation of
section 409(a) and allays Justice White’s fears by ensuring that ERISA’s
remedial provisions are not read to afford the beneficiary with less
protection than he would have had prior to 1974.252 Instead, revival of the
surcharge remedy gives ERISA beneficiaries access to the same form of
trust based compensatory relief that would have been available to pension
participants prior to 1974 without the mental contortion courts frequently
undertook prior to Great-West.253 Recognition of such an award is also
consistent with the Court’s earlier denial of compensatory “make whole”
relief against a non-fiduciary in Mertens because surcharge is only available
against fiduciaries.254
Because surcharge, unlike the restitution, does not sit on the line of
law and equity, Great-West’s distinction between claims to traceable
property versus claims against general assets is not relevant to
categorization of the 502(a)(2) stock drop action.255 However, since both
compensation for losses incurred from breach of fiduciary duty).
251. See supra Part II.B.
252. See supra notes 1157–59 (identifying two major trends in the ERISA remedial
scheme and highlighting Justice Whites’ major contention in his Mertens dissent that
explained compensatory relief was available in post-merger pre-ERISA trust actions); see
also Langbein, supra note 23, at 1350–51 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s statements in Russell
and Mertens—specifically that monetary relief was legal relief not available as “appropriate
equitable relief”—were overly generalized and incorrect because some monetary awards
were exclusively equitable).
253. See Langbein, supra note 23, at 1361–62 (explaining that “[u]ntil Great-West,
some courts had strained to grant consequential relief despite the holding in Mertens by
characterizing the relief as restitution—for example, by treating as restitutionary the
recovery of interest on a benefit payment long delayed”).
254. See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1880 (2011) (explaining that,
“unlike the defendant in Mertens, [the current defendant] is analogous to a trustee [and
therefore] makes a critical difference”).
255. See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212
(2002) (explaining that relief falling under the rubric of restitution can be either legal or
equitable); DOBBS, supra note 235, § 4.1(2), at 556 (explaining that restitution sits on the
line between law (replevin & assumpsit) and equity (constructive trust, equitable lien,
accounting)); see also CIGNA Corp.,131 S. Ct. at 1880 (explaining that, unlike restitution in
which monetary claims were usually at law, a “monetary remedy against a trustee . . . was
‘exclusively equitable.’”).
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the Mertens and Seventh Amendment inquiries still require a substantive
examination beyond remedial labels,256 section 409(a)’s lost profits remedy
is only “exclusively equitable” in the eyes of the Seventh Amendment
where the defendant was a fiduciary in breach of a fiduciary duty and the
lost profits compensate for losses to the plan that resulted from such
breach.257 The equitable nature of Hellman’s relief is confirmed when this
standard is applied to the study case. Despite the fact that any potential
monetary recovery would be solely recoverable from the defendant’s
general assets, Hellman was able to establish that the administrator was a
plan fiduciary, a breach of duty resulted in the loss of his 401(k), and that
the requested relief compensates a “failure to realize income, capital gain,
or appreciation that would have resulted from proper [plan]
administration[.]”258
Finally, the forgoing analysis should survive the CIGNA dissent’s
skeptical citation to Knieriem v. Group Health Plan259 because the case
dealt only with the question of whether the relevant facts merited surcharge
in conjunction with a restitutionary accounting of profits and completely
failed to evaluate whether surcharge as a standalone non-restitutionary
equitable remedy.260 Because ERISA is grounded in pre-merger trust law
256. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at 211–14 (rejecting the
plaintiff’s characterization of the requested relief based upon a substantive inquiry in the
actual nature of the relief requested); Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v.
Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990) (explaining that the second prong of the “historical test”
requires an examination of the nature of the relief requested).
257. Kenseth v. Dean Health Plan, Inc., 722 F.3d 869, 880–82 (7th Cir. 2013) (basing
its description of the elements necessary for a prayer to substantively constitute surcharge on
the Supreme Court’s description in CIGNA).
258. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 95(b) (2012) (explaining that surcharge
included both amounts charged in excess of traceable property identified in an accounting
and independently for losses incurred by the trust due to fiduciary breach); see also Princess
Lida of Thurn and Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 463–64 (1939) (finding that a remedy
seeking to hold a plan fiduciary personally liable for losses to a trust plan resulting from plan
mismanagement was a remedy within the court’s equitable jurisdiction).
259. See 434 F.3d 1058, 1063–64 (8th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that
the remedy he sought, “restitution and surcharge” for alleged breach of fiduciary duty in
denying medical benefits, constituted a surcharge awardable in equity).
260. See id. at 1063 (explaining that the plaintiff argued that the surcharge was
available because it had been awarded under a similar fact pattern in Parke v. First Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1994)). The Eighth Circuit rejected this
argument, reasoning that “Knieriem misapplie[d] Parke.” Id. The court explained that,
unlike the plaintiff in Knieriem, the Parke case involved a claim for payment of prejudgment
interest under a 502(a)(1)(B) action for accounting of profits. Id. Contrary to the plaintiff’s
alleged meaning, Parke was found to only stand for the proposition that an accounting of
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and Hellman’s requested remedy mirrors an equitable surcharge “brought
for [its own] purpose,” unrelated to the restitutionary claims accounting of
profits, constructive trust, equitable lien, or quasi-contract, the district court
erred in concluding that it constituted a request for “legal relief” entitled to
trial by jury.261
VI. Conclusion
While the rise of the defined contribution plan provides several
advantages, such as increased plan control, unique plan portability, and
potentially higher investment returns, it also revives some of the socially
unjust administrative risks prevalent in the pre-1974 pension system.262 For
example, making retirement security dependent on the sophistication of
participant investors places low-income and low education households at
higher risk of retirement insecurity because they lack expertise to evaluate
the prudence of employer provided portfolios or financial flexibility to
establish alternative retirement savings.263 Higher household risk combined
with an aging population’s increased reliance on the private pension system
increased the frequency stock drop class actions.264 Questions regarding

profits, which is a traditionally equitable remedy invoked in conjunction with constructive
trust, included the disgorge of fiduciary profits when the wrongful conduct constituted a
breach of fiduciary duty. Id. However, Knieriem failed to address the independent
applicability of surcharge as an equitable remedy distinct from restitution. Id.
261. BOGERT, supra note 248; see also supra Part II, section B (discussing the contours
of equitable and legal remedies and the impact such categorization has on questions of
Seventh Amendment jury trial availability).
262. See PERUN & STEUERLE, supra note 103, at 6 (noting modern ERISA system
supports larger investment earnings ($117 billion for defined contribution plans and $41
billion for defined benefit plans) and “pa[ys] out more in benefits ($98 billion for defined
contribution plans and $85 billion for defined benefit plans),” but noting that all returns are
employee driven).
263. See JOHN BROADBENT, MICHAEL PALUMBO, & ELIZABETH WOODMAN, THE SHIFT
FROM DENIED BENEFIT TO DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSION PLANS—IMPLICATIONS FOR
ASSET
ALLOCATION
AND
RISK MANAGEMENT
ii
(2006),
available
at
https://www.bis.org/publ/wgpapers/cgfs27broadbent3.pdf (explaining that the shift from
defined benefit to defined contribution plans means shifting the risk of loss from
shareholders to households, and that plan participants in both developed and emerging
pension markets are more exposed to risks in the financial market).
264. See LEWIS, supra note 8, at 2 (explaining that more than 200 ERISA employer
“stock drop” class action lawsuits have been filed alleging that plan fiduciaries breach their
ERISA duties of prudence and loyalty by allowing participants to invest in employer stock).
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jury trial availability flows naturally from the increased prevalence of the
stock drop suit.265
Despite Mertens’s and Great-West’s narrowing definition of
“traditional equitable relief,” a substantive examination of the stock drop
action reveals that the elusive ERISA jury trial remains unavailable.266 In
light of the Supreme Court’s holding in LaRue, which permitted
beneficiaries to recover for injuries to their individualized defined
contribution accounts, it is unclear whether a section 502(a)(2) stock drop
class action should fail to constitute “legal relief” based upon section
409(a)’s restriction of recovery “to the plan” instead of “to the plaintiff”
alone.267 However, even if recovery to individualized employer-held
accounts could constitute legal relief, our case study of Hellman reveals that
section 502(a)(2) “stock drop” actions nonetheless seek typically equitable
relief.268 This is because the surcharge is a distinctly equitable remedy
wholly independent from the concept of “legal relief” or post-merger
concept of restitution.269 Hellman’s section 502(a)(2) “stock drop”
recovery, despite not being requested in conjunction with an accounting of
profits, still constitutes a surcharge brought “for [its own] purpose.”270
Finally, because the Supreme Court’s narrowed definition of ERISA
“equitable relief” parallels the pre-merger law and equity distinction of the
Seventh Amendment “historical test,” it follows that Hellman’s section
502(a)(2) stock drop action for recovery of section 409(a) lost profits is not
constitutionally entitled to the availability of a jury trial.271

265. See supra Part V.
266. See supra Part III.B.
267. See supra Part V.B (determining that the similar nature of recovery “to a plan” and
“to the plaintiff” after LaRue should not be found to prevent the remedy’s categorization as
legal relief).
268. See supra Part V.C (explaining that the basis of the claim and nature of the remedy
sought in Hellman’s stock drop action were “traditionally available in equity”); see also
PERUN & STEUERLE, supra note 103, at 6 (explaining that defined contribution participants
bear more risk than defined benefit participants due to their investment control).
269. See supra Part V.C (explaining the deficiencies and omissions of the Knieriem
opinion cited by Justice Scalia’s dissent in CIGNA).
270. See supra Part V.C (referencing treatises and “standard current works” to conclude
that the equitable surcharge is an independent distinctively equitable remedy).
271. See supra Part V.A (explaining the similarities between the two tests and
concluding that it is impossible to reach differing determinations whereby a claim is
equitable under one and legal under the other).
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Resurrection of the surcharge partially remedies Justice White’s
concern that the Court was ignoring ERISA’s remedial purpose in denying
compensatory liability, but necessarily means that plan participants lack the
extra protection of a jury trial.272 While the jury trial would have probably
provided some peace of mind, it is important to remember that its absence
does not mean defined contribution plan enrollees are helpless.273 Any
advantage provided by a jury trial would have only been relevant as a last
line of defense for plan losses already incurred and there might be an
advantage to keeping complicated ERISA actions before experienced
judges that are more likely to be familiar with the statute’s complexities.274
The unavailability of the jury trial should only serve as additional incentive
for plan participants to attempt to educate themselves on reliability of
employer provided investment options, establish independent personal
savings whenever possible, and invest conservatively.275 In addition to selfhelp, Congressional legislation requiring that defined contribution plans
secure independent investment advice for enrollees or employ third party
advisors to govern the availability of company stock options would honor
ERISA’s social justice origins by protecting the low-income households
most threatened by new participant driven scheme.276 Reforms like these,
272. See supra Part III.B (explaining that a narrower construction might deprive
participants of compensatory relief that would be available if they had brought to action as a
breach of trust prior to 1974).
273. See LEWIS, supra note 8, at 2 (demonstrating that, despite the rarity of the jury
trial, plan participants are bringing an increased number of stock-drop complaints and
tagalong securities fraud complaints against companies and their executives).
274. See PERUN & STEUERLE, supra note 103, at 4 (listing the complexity arising from
ERISA’s many rules, uncertainty arising from the ambiguity of statutory test, and
inconsistency arising from a plethora of exceptions as some the problems non-experts have
with the statute).
275. See BROADBENT, PALUMBO & WOODMAN, supra note 263, at 40–41 (listing inertia,
procrastination, and myopia as suggesting improvement in “financial literacy” and as a
potential path to improving returns and improving retirement security).
276. See id. at 38 (explaining that “a large body of research . . . demonstrates that
financial planning and investing for retirement is not something that comes easily to most
people” and that “financial literacy surveys find that many individuals lack even the basic
knowledge required to successfully manage their own retirement plans”); see also
VANGUARD CONSULTING, supra note 8, at 6 (explaining that investment loss on employer
provided stock options is increased when employers place high-level corporate officials with
potential conflicting interests on the review board in charge of ensuring portfolio reliability);
Tim Kohn & Warren Cormier, How to Improve the Experience of Defined Contribution
Participants, DIMENSIONAL FUND ADVISORS 1, 8 (2011), available at
http://www.dfaus.com/pdf/DC_Experience.pdf (listing “get professional-grade help for your
participants” as a way to improve retirement security under defined contribution plans).
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which decrease the need for safety valve litigation by reducing
administrative risk, will do more for retirement stability and comfort of
mind than any jury.277

277. See BROADBENT, PALUMBO & WOODMAN, supra note 263, at 39–41 (listing several
other researcher-developed ideas for ways to change the structure of administrative
programs to improve the retirement security “for a large number of workers under [deified
contribution] and 401(k)-type pension plans”).

